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Crime and Evil: Meta-Theory, Theory, and Praxis in
Forensic Psychology

Eric David Kunkel
George Fox College
Newberg, Oregon

Abstract

The prevalence of crime is a world-wide problem,
and concomitantly, the fear of crime grips the public.
Also, social scientists remain pessimistic about
solutions:

many acquiesce in the •nothing works"

conclusion.

T~e

general populace views crime as both

pathological (i.e., sick) and evil.

Privately, social

scientists may agree, but professionally they describe
crime as nothing but an illness.

This research

establishes that such reductionism limits the
explanatory power of forensic psychology and that
ruling out the existence of evil a priori is
unscientific.

First, the philosophy of science

underlying the study of crime is examined.

The history
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of science, the current realist versus antirealist
debate, the nature of scientific methods, and the
necessity of herrr.eneutics are reviewed.

Charles

Darwin's Baconian methodology (i.e., consulting both
general and special revelation) will be adopted.

Then,

the scientific character of theological constructs
(e.g., evil) and the religious a priori of all
theoretical thought are examined.

Exa..~ining

crime and

evil concurrently actually safeguards science from
dogmatism, while
true science.

scie~tism

S:cond,

is a self-refuting enemy of

crirni~ological

psychology is

investigated in the context of human nature in general.
Criminality is shown to be a quasi-psychological
construct, and Hippocratic and Aristotelian causality
is reviewed.

Several psychological views of crime

(e.g., Cleckley's psychopathy, the Cognitive-Behavioral
approach, the Neopsychoanalytic view, and

~he

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's [DSM) Antisocial
Personality diagnosis) are analyzed alongside the
construct of human evil as developed in theological
anthropology.
offenders is

Third, psychological treatment of
exa..~ined.

Only when evil is recognized

does criminal responRibility make sense.

The common-

sense attribution that severe criminality is both evil
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and psychopathological is affirmed.

Further research

in criminal moral development, abnormal psychology, and
responsibility-grounded psychotherapy is suggested.
Some possible public policy implications (e.g.,
restitution-based corrections) are discussed.
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CHAPTER l

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

The Study of Crime
Divergent opinions abound about crime, its rate,
its causes, and its solutions (Lewis, 1980).

Latent

notions emerge when a heinous crime occurs in society,
such as the assassina.t.ion of a president or the
ccc'.!rrence cf se;;ial hor:Uc:.d..:! (Dobson, 19 69) .

Yet, people have un.clear and contradictory ideas
about crime (Wilsen & Herrnstein, 1985).

People fuse

scientific and moral attributions about the causes and
the cures of criminality (Harvey & Weary, 1985; Heider,
1958; Katz, 1988).

Both the citizenry and the

professional conununity adopt a mixed vocabulary when
seeking to describe a criminal act:

the same crime is

seen as illegal, sick, and evil.
While philosophers, psychiatrists, sociologists,
theologians, and criminologists all offer opinions
about crime and criminals, Eysenck (1977) argued that
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psychologists are the professionals with the greatest
potential contribution to make in understanding the
causes and cures of criminality.

"No system of

criminology has any meaning that disregards the central
feature of all criminology:

the individual person we

are trying to influencen (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989,
p. 8).

Professional psychologists are uniquely suited

to investigate the perplexing problem of crime.

Forensic Psvchologv
Psychologists who serve in criminal or penal
settings have a profound responsibility to benefit the
client/patient and society.

They are subpoenaed to

offer expert testimony about crime and criminals
(Kaplan & Sadock, 1988; Stone, 1988).

They research

the mental disorders afflicting criminals and are
mandated by statute to develop treatment plans to
ameliorate their criminality (Deering's California
Penal Code, 1985) .

Forensic clinicians and researchers

write opinions that have far-reaching ramifications.
The safety of society may be at issue.

So may the

disposition of a patient's criminal case:

he/she may

receive life in prison, be committed to an institution
or be given the death penalty.

If inmates are found
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guilty and treatment is adjudicated, then they have the
right to effective treatment {American Psychological
Association [APA], 1974, 1981).

Therefore, the

standards of psychological practice and the existence
of the offender population behoove the forensic
psychologist to develop effective treatment modalities
based on sound, scientific theories.

The Problem

Scientism'3 Discor;ion gf Sciencg
For psychologists to study and treat criminals in
a professional, echical, and scholarly manner, they
must take all of the psychological da.ta into account.
Sound, parsimonious theories that fully explain crime
and human nature should be the goal of psychological
theory-building {Miller, 1989).
However,

~4ny

criminal psychologies omit

humankind's free moral agency from the scope of
scientific inquiry {Menninger, 1973; Peck, 1983).
Also, radical reductionism, naturalism, and positivism
have removed the idea of evil {and value-judgrr.ent in
general) from psychology's domain {Berger, 1969;
Bergin, 1987; Schuster, 1987).
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Psychology, in an atte.'T,;)t to justify its
scientific status, has adopted scientism instead
(Moreland, 1989).

Scientism is an inflated view of

science in which knowledge in general is equated with
modern scientific practice.

Those holding this view

also do little to define science or to place it in its
historical context (Flew, 1979).
Scientism is a rather unsophisticated view, but it
is pervasive in our culture due to the indisputable
advances of science and technology.

In short,

scientisml is the view that "science has all the
answers"; it is fundamentally a religious position and
a dogmatic one at that (Morris, 1984) .

E:yil as Scientific Data
The experience of human evil is a real part of the
human ccndition.
but

prete~ding

Evil may be difficult to investigate,

a phenomenon does not exist can never

advance the cause of science.

Staub called evil "part

of a broadly shared human cultural heritage• (1989, p.
25).

He found it necessary to invoke the concept of

l •scientism• and other technical terms are defined briefly in
Appendix A.
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evil in order to explain genocidal behavior.

Fromm

(1973), White (1961), and Peck (1983) have also thought
that evil was well within the purview of psychological
study.

Psychology itself is defiLed and redefined in

virtually every new textbook.

Furthermore, th.e

definition of psychology and its scope is not even a
psychological question:

it is a metaphysical question

and can only be answered by the philosophy of science
(James, 1890/1990; Pannenberg, 1973/1976).
Dooyeweerd (1960/1980), the eminent Reformed
philosopher, noted chat all of creation is open to
systematic investigation.

Therefore, the data of human

evil is open to scientific inquiry.

Why?

Because it

is the:-e.
Also, to dictate that a particular phenomenon is
outside the boundaries of a science a priori is unwise
(Moreland, 1989).

For example, a given phenomenon

(e.g., achievement, religiosity, or crime) is often
fruitfully investigated by sociology, social
psychology, and clinical psychology.
Moving from the general to the particular reveals
a problem, first in science, then in psychology, and
specifically in forensic psychology today.
have adopted scientisrn as their creed.

Scientists

Because of
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this, they have neglected the obvious:

the existence

of human evil as a fundamental determinant of crime.

The Theory

Rebuilding Forensic Psychology
White (1987) followed

Willia.~

James (1890/1990)

and argued that the soul (psyche) needs to be put back
into psychology.2

Others argue for a psychology

reconstructed along these same lines (Carter &
Narramore, 1979; Cosgrove & Mallory, 1977).
A forensic psychology that is reconstructed to
include the entire data set of human experience should
theoretically be more inclusive and be better able to
explain deviant human behavior (Bellah, 1991; Hall,
1945).

This study will contribute to that

reconstruction by proposing the theory that crime and
evil can and should be examined concurrently in order
to establish an adequate foundation for forensic
psychology.

2 Etymologically speaking, ~ology minus the ~ is the
study of nothing.
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Corollaries to the Theory
The theory that crime and evil should be examined
concurrently will be postulated with three corollaries.
The exposition of these corollaries and the evaluation
of them in light of any data ge:nnane to forensic
psychology will constitute the remainder of this study.
The three subsequent sections of this dissertation will
apply the crime and evil construct to these levels cf
analysis:

meta-theory, theory proper, and praxis {see

Table 1).

Crime and evil theory and its three

corollary theories will be held

te~tatively

until the

end of the inquiry.

Table 1
Tb.Lee Levels of Theoretical A-.11alysis Critiqued with
Crime and Evil Theorv
1. META-THEORY:

Theory about theory.

2. THEORY:

Theory proper.

3. PRAXIS:

Theory applied.

First, the crime and evil postulate will be tested
against the philosophy of science (meta-theory).

Then

it will be evaluated alongside the current
psychological views of criminality {theory).

Last, the
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crime and evil model will be tested in the context of
current psychologically-based criminal interventions
(praxis)

(see Table 2).

Table 2
Crime and Eyil Iheor:y and its Corollaries
The Theory
Crime and evil should be examined concurrently in order
to establish an adequate foundation for forensic
psychology.

The Corollaries
l. Ihe Meta-theoretical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in
order to establish the philosophy of science
underlying forensic psychology.
2. The Theoretical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in
order to understand criminal human nature.
3. The Practical Level.
Crime and evil should be investigated together in
order to provide effective clinical treatment for
criminals.

Crime and Evil
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Methodoloaical Tasks
More specifically, the following three goal
statements parallel the three levels of inquiry above:
Invi:stioaticn from a Meta-Theoretical Persnective
The foundational contribution of
science to the
examined.

proble..~

t~e

philosophy of

of crime and evil will be

Definitions of science, the distinction

between theory and meta-theory, the human science
approach, the interpretation of data, and the problem
of meaning will be discussed (Moreland, 1989;
Pannenberg, 1973/1976; Polkinghorne, 1991; Van Leeuwen,
1985).

Overall, the

~ajar

question investigated will

i::>e whether evil ca.n be i.n·;e::itiga::.ed scientifically and
whether a comprehensive crime and evil \:heo:cy helps or
hinders in establishing the foundation of forensic
psychology.

Also, the possibility of integrating

psychology and theology will be broached.

The view of

science developed in the first section will provide the
structure for the rest of the inquiry.
Investigation from a Theoretical Persnective
The use of medico-legal (crime) and moral (evil}
attributions in criminologic descriptions will be
explored.

The terms psychopathy and antisocial

personality will be examined.

The status of DSM
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criteria will be reviewed.

Also, underlying

assumptions in current personological theory will be
discussed (Cleckley, 1976; Eysenck, 1986; Millon, 1986;
Widiger, Frances, Pincus, Davis, & First, 1991).
Concurrent with these inquiries, the quasipsychological nature of criminality and the idea of
criminal causality will be introduced.

Then

psychological explanations of crime (Hare, 1970; Meloy,
1988; Samenow, 1984; Walters, 1990) and theological
explanations of evil (Erickson, 1985; Saucy, 1993) will
be considered.
Investigation from a Ptactical Perspective
The ramifications that one's theory of crime and
evil (i.e., attributions) has on the treatment and
amelioration of criminality will be investigated.

The

issues of punishment, rehabilitation, and restoration
will be explored.

The difficulties and discouragements

that come with treating severe criminals will be
examined.

Also, the importance of a sense of

responsibility and adequate moral development in
inmate/patients will be discussed (Colson & Van Ness,
1989; Fingarette, 1988; Kohlberg, 1981; Meloy, 1992;
Umbreit, 1985).
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Limits of the Study
This research is not intended to replace textbooks
in forensic or abnormal psychology, the philosophy of
science, or forensic treatment.

9ecause of the breadth

of this undertaking, the completed inquiry will take
the form of a prolegomenon or introduction.

III'!Il'anuel

Kant wrote that prolegomena
are designed for preparatory exercises; they are
intended rather to point out what we have to do in
order if possible to actualise a science, than to
propound it.

They must therefore rest upon

something already kno;..n as trustworthy, from which
we can set out with confidence, aud ascend to
sources as yet ur.}:nown. (1969, p. 313)
This research will seek to integrate the extant
scientific knowledge concerning crime and evil in order
to provide a needed preface to forensic psychology.

Crime and Evil
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CHAPTER 2

META-THEORY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE

Psychology in Context

Chapter l of this inquiry asserted the necessity
of considering the construct of evil alongside any
investigation into criminality.

At first glance, given

the current intellectual milieu, this may seem like an
apples and oranges comparison.
This chapter will describe and characterize the
current state of psychological science.

It will show

that the consideration of a construct like evil
enriches science.

The fact that some current views of

science that ignore such constructs reduce science to a
mere caricature of itself will be shown.

Psychology in the Universe of the Sciences
Irwin Schrodinger, the great physicist, wrote
several books about science in general, but he felt
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uneasy about these projects.

An

unwritten law in

science is that
a scientist is supposed to have a complete and
thorough knowledge, at first hand, of some
subjects and, therefore, is usually expected not
to write on any topic of which he is not a master.
This is regarded as a matter of noblesse oblige.
(Schrodinger, 1944/1990, p. 467)
Yet he did explore the wider field of science in
general because he believed in
studies.

cross-disciplinar~

However, Schrcdinger believed that no

scientist really understood her own discipline unless
she could understar-d it in the
of study.

ccntex~

of other modes

He recounted hew the word •university"

denotes a universal course of study and opined t:iat
such a universal context was necessary for any true
learning to take place.

Likewise, this inquiry will

attempt to place criminological or forensic psychology
in its universal context as a science.

Psychology and the Nature of Science
Modern psychological science was born slightly
more than one hundred years ago with the founding of
empirical psychology both in the United States and in

Crime and Evil
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Gennany.

The liberation of psychology from philosophy

marked its birth (Boring, 1957).

Interestingly, Evans

(1989) believed that many psychologists want to deny
their philosophical birthright.

He noted that

"disputes in psychology are invariably philosophical in
character, though psychologists themselves have a
penchant for calling philosophical disagreements
•methodological'" (p. 24).

The Presuppositions of Modern Science
Sigmund Freud was more frank when he set forth his
meta-psychological presuppositions:

•our best hope for

the future is that the intellect--the scientific
spirit, reason--should in time establish a dictatorship
over the human mind" (1939/1990, p. 880).
The nineteenth century was dominated by an
optimistic zeitgeist.

Science was believed to be well

on its way to solving all of life's problems.

Leading

physicists claimed that the world was basically
understood; their work was finished.3

3 Einstein's equations confounded this claim (1916/1990).
However, this has not dampened the scientific optimism of many,
even until today.

Cri~e
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Over and against the dictatorship of reason that
Freud proposed, twentieth-century thinkers have
examined the limits of science.

Kuhn (1970) challenged

the scientific community to examine the way science is
done.

Studies in the philosophy of science have

abounded recently (Laudan, 1990) .

This spirit of

scrutiny has not trickled down to all scientists,
however.

Many investigators seem to proceed with

Freud's agenda.
Basic science researchers, practitioners, and
laypersons

genera~ly

share a ccmmon ignorance of what

science is and how it is done.

Moreland, recounting

the narrow scope of his own scientific training and
scientific training in general, recalled:
Serious study in the history and philosophy of
science was singularly absent from most science
curricula.

The scientist is trained in first-

order practi es of : udying amoebas, quarks, and
the like.

He is not trained in the second-order

practice of studying science as a discipline.
(1989, p. 57)
Kuhn was one of the first to emphasize that
philosophy of science must fit the actual history of
science and the practice of scientists.

However, given
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the explosion of literature in the philosophy of
science, the public perception and the popular
preser.tation of science is inexplicable.
Limitless, om.;ipotent science is treated with the
reverence that the ancients accorded to the gods.

For

example, C. S. Lewis once described someone he knew who
gave little thought to her own mortality because she
confidently believed that science would soon solve the
problem of death (1978).

He noted that the word

science carries an honorific connotation.

Lewis, with

tongue in cheek, coined the term neophilia to describe
the current fascination with the latest technology and
the newest ideas.
Neophiliacs aside, science does have a context and
a history.

Understanding the place of science is

essential for psychologists and for all practitioners
of science in order to best use and to avoid the abuse
of science (APA, 1981).

A Brief History of the Physical and Human Sciences
The ancient Greeks are the earliest known
systematic scientists.4

Aristotle broke with his

4 For a discussion of pre-Socratic science, see Clark (1957).
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mentor, Plato, and instead of being concerned primarily
with metaphysical ideas, began to study this-worldly
phenomena (Durant, 1961).

The Aristotelian approach to

science dominated until the rise of English empiricism
(e.g., Roger and Francis Bacon)

(Burtt, 1939).

The

tenn science is derived from the Latin scientia, which
means "knowledge• (see Table 3).

From antiquity,

science meant any orderly pursuit of knowledge.

Table 3
Dualistic Divisions of the Sciences
~:rd"

Si;;iences

Phvsical Sciences

"SQfJ;;"

Theorist

Sci~I).f,;j2S

!Human Science

Episteme

Soohia

Jl..ris cot 1 e

Scientia

Sapientia

Auqustine

Substantia Coroorea Subs tan ti a Coqitans Descartes

s. Mill

Science Phvsiaues

Science Morale

J.

NaturNissenschaft

Geistwissenschaft

Dilthev

Naturwissenschaft

Kulturwissenschaft

(Windelband

Idioqraohic

Nomothetic

and Rickert)

Aristotle (1990al, in the Nichomachean Ethics,
~akes

a distinction between two kinds of knowledge,

I
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episteme and sophia.

However, Augustine's Latin

terminology solidified the divide between what is now
called the hard and soft or physical and human sciences
(Pannenberg, 1973/1976).

Augustine continued to use

the term scientia but added the expression sapientia
(wisdom) to describe theology and philosophy.S

Divisions of Science
Pannenberg (1973/1976) believed that modern
philosophers of science were influenced by Descartes•
dualism.

Descartes had no fully developed philosophy

of science of his own.

He did, however, provide the

dichotomous categories that influenced the philosophy
of science, especially through the last century.
Descartes believed that there are two kinds of
substance:

mental (substantia cogitans) and physical

(substantia corporea) (1644/1990).

After Descartes,

both the mental and the physical were considered
equally real.6

Radical dualism behooved subsequent

5 The social sciences were subsumed under philosophy.
6 Later English empiricism and German idealism were largely
reactions to Cartesian dualism (Durant, 1961).
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scientists to deal with these two very different
domains.
In 1843 John Stuart Mill

pu.~lished

his Looic.

In

er.apter 6, he distinguished between the natural or
physical sciences and what he termed the moral
sciences.

For Mill, the moral sciences included

empirical psychology, history,

th~

science of society,

and what he called ethology.7
So, his use of the term moral was broader than
common English usage.

The derivation of moral in

Mill's work is likely from the French phrase sciences

morales, which was in use at that time and carried the
wider connotation (Alibert, 1806).
The German translation of Mill's work rendered
moral sciences as Geisteswissenschaften, or sciences of
mind.

This terminology was no doubt chosen due to the

influence of German idealism, especially Hegel
{l82l/l990l, who used Geistwissenschaft to describe his

philosophy of mind.

The English "human sciences•S is a

translation of Geisteswissenschaften, for example, in

7 This was an ethical psychology, not Lorenz's ethology.
8 Likely a compound from the Latin hµmanitas (the humanities) and
scientia (Cicero, 1986) .
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Wilhelm Dilthey•s Introduction to the Human Sciences
(1989).
The South-West German School of thought vigorously
rejected the term Geist:wissenschaft perhaps because of
its Hegelian connotations (Rickert, 1986; Windelband,
1901/1935).

They preferred the term

Kulturwissenschaft, but the difference in approach to

the human and physical sciences is far more than an
arcane study of foreign etymologies.

Rickert and

Windelband on the one hand and Dilthey on the other
disagreed on something much more basic.

The Idiographic and the Nomothetic
Aristotle, Augustine, Mill, and Dilthey classified
the sciences based on subject matter.

Some sciences

were •hard" sciences; other sciences were "soft."
Pannenberg writes:
Originally the classification of the sciences
according to the Cartesian dualism of nature and
mind was based on the assumption of a fundamental
difference in kind between the objects described
by these terms, and upholders of it reasoned from
this assumption to the necessity of a
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corresponding difference in the methods used in
their scientific study. (1973/1976, p. 116)
Windelband, and Rickert after him, distinguished
the sciences based on their respective methods, not on
the objects of study.

This is still a controversy in

the human science/physical science debate (Oakes,
1988).
Windelband and Rickert contrasted the
individualizing (idiographic} approach of the human
sciences with the generalizing (nornothetic) approach of
the natural sciences (Rickert, 1986).
Rickert critiqued Dilthey's inclusion of
psychology as a hu.'l\an science.

The establishment of

the psychological laboratories of Wundt, James, and
others had demonstrated that psychology was not
Geist:wissenschaft only.
Rickert's distinction between idiographic and
nornothetic procedures was not meant to draw hard and
fast lines.

Idiographic approaches are used in the

natural sciences as well.

Pannenberg agreed and noted

several specific "hard science• uses of idiographic
methods.

In these cases, truly individual causes

produce unique effects (see Table 4)
1973/1976) .

(Pannenberg,
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Table 4
The Use of Individualizing !Idiograohicl Methods in the
Natural Sciences
The Study of Malformations in Embryology.
The Meteorology of Low Pressure Systems.
The Study of Cosmology.
The Cevelopment of Natural Landscapes.
The Study of Heredity.

The hunian sciences use nomothetic methods as well.
The human sciences and even the humanities strive for
nomological certainty by using

e..~pirical

methods.

Computer studies of vocabulary in literary texts is one
example (Friberg & Friberg, 1981).
Psychology is obviously one discipline where
idiographic (the case study) and nomothetic (the search
for psychological laws) approaches are both used.
Divergent schools of psychology use case studies to
verify their nomothetic theories; each has its own
little Hans or Albert.

Science; Multiple Descriptors of a Single Reality
The various sciences describe one reality.
Dividing science up dualistically into hard and fast
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categories {like human versus natural sciences) or
reifying the approved method of inquiry {the
idiographic versus the nomocheticl does sciencif ic
inquiry a disservice.

Scientific Description of Reality

Psychologists and other scientists have an image
of their disciplines.

Currently, this image includes

the notions of science as realistic, value-free,
naturalistic, a:::id posicivistic.

Whether science ever

was, now is, or e·Jer could be any of these things is
doubtful.

Scientific J..dvance: Evolution or Revolution?
Henri Bergson (1913) thought that all of
humankind's endeavors were moving forward with
inevitable progress.

Scientists often present science

this way, advancing steadily and inexorably, even
though this

auto~atic

progress is never defined or

quantified.
However, Thomas Kuhn (1970), Paul Feyerabend
(1975), and other philosophers of science have noted
that science does not proceed smoothly:

science is "a
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series of discontinuous replacements" (Moreland, 1989,
p. 164).

The history of science is a somewhat jerky story
of replaced theories that worked for a while but
then dropped off the scene.

If this is true, then

why should we have any confidence in the

approximate truth of our current theories or in
the existence of the things they postulate?

A

pessimistic induction from the history of science
justifies our believing that since most, perhaps
all, of past theories were later abandoned, our
current theories will be abandoned as well. (p.
159)
Science does not progress smoothly.
cannot be said to sharpen older theories:
overthrow them.

New data
they

The adoption of a new theory is like a

perceptual gestalt switch.

One minute the percept

appears to look like one thins and then with a blink of
the eye the same data can be interpreted as something
else.
Often little, if any, continuity exists between
tenns in many theories.

Moreland noted, for instance,

that Thomson's and Bohr's theories of the composition
of an atom are incommensurable, that is, they really
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refer to two very different things (1989) .

Comparing

the word "electron" in these two theories is like
comp~=ing

the word •red" in a paper on wavelengths of

light and communist •red" politics.

In short, science

does not grow slowly, accurately, and methodically like
some scientists would have the public and larger
scientific community believe.

Science moves with jerks

and spasms; it also follows false trails.

Scientists

often try to gloss over the glaring inconsistencies in
their theories in order to preserve their respective
systems.

For this, Feyerabend, who is not known for

understatement, has called moderr.. scientists
intellectual criminals (Horgan, 1993).

Realism and Antirealisrn
Coupled with the popular idea of scientific
optimism and the idea of automatic human progress in
general is the notion that science provides a
progressively truer and truer picture of the world
(Laudan, 1990).

This view, that science actually

describes reality, is known as scientific realism or
isomorphism (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites
(see also Appendix Bl
Common Usage:

R~S!li~m:

IQ.~S!Hlilm:

Pragmatic, this

Utopian, other

worldly.

worldly.

Philosophy of

R~ali~m:

Antii;:~~li§m:

Science:

Science tells us

Science provides

about the real

useful fictions

world.

about the world.

Since the collapse of logical positivism, and
especially since Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1970), an absolute faith in scientific
realism has declined (Laudan, 1990; Van Fraasen, 1980).
Popularizers of science often still portray science
with realistic nomenclature, however.
Characteristically, this view of science includes the
idea that science has a unique methodology {i.e., the
scientific method) that the humanities and other
academic endeavors do not possess.
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Scientific Methcd(s}
Introductory science textbooks usually begin with
a definition of science and the scientific method.
They often attribute the advances of science to the
adoption of this method (Moreland, 1989).
A review of the history of science seems to bear
this contention out to some degree.

The birth of

modern science in general is usually said to coincide
with the inductive proposals of Francis Bacon in the
late renaissance and the founding o= the Royal Society
in London.

These early scientists departed from

deductive and specul::itive arguments and began to gather
data to support their conclusions.

They wanted to move

away from speculating ho" many angels could fit on the
head of a pin, as had been done in the medieval
university.
A review of Newton's Principia (1687/1990) and
Bacon's Novwn Oraanum (1620/1990b) and Advancement of
Learnina (1605/1990a) obviously shows that even these
early scientists lacked method .:ilogical agreement.
Newton and Bacon favored

~he

introduction of

inductivism, but these documents do not contain a
single, unanimous, timeless scientific method as
proponents of radical empiricism assert.

These men
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were "eclectics, methodological opportunists"
(Feyerabend, 1982, p. 641) .

Newton, for instance,

derived many of his results from mathematical models,
not from any process resembling today's scientific
method.
As Moreland (1987, 1989) noted, no one scientific

method exists,9 but rather recognizable scientific
methodologies.

Whether such a thing as a scientific

method exists is itself a meta-scientific question that
must be addressed by the philosophy of science
(Feyeraber.d, 1975) .

To believe that natural science

has a specific methodology at its disposal that is
unavailable to the human sciences, the humanities,
philosophy, or theology is a fiction.

Pure Empiricism
David Hume posed this famous question about
academic inquiry:

Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
quantity or number?

No.

Does it contain any

experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact
and existence?

No.

Commit it then to the flames:

9 Science texts usually assume or simplify the scientific method.
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for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion.

(1748/1939, p.

689)

As noted, scientists pride themselves in their

liberation from deductive methods.

Even though Hume's

criteria are very narrow and would scarcely allow any
science to take place at all, scientists often revert
to pure empiricism.
Besides the

proble.~

of Hume's assertion being

self-refuting (he has condemned his own book to the
realm of sophistry and illusion) , David Hume called for
the supre..11acy of empirical method3.

The

proble~

with

radical empiricism alone is that one can never get
beyond particular data to generalize to other possible
phenomena {Heisenberg, 1958/1990).
The results of Hume's criteria are seen in the
parable about the man who filled notebook upon notebook
with uncensored observations.

Near the end of his life

he brought them proudly to the Smithsonian.

Of course,

they had no use for them because the jumble of data was
unstructured and uninterpretable (Moreland, 1989).
Pure empiricism leads only to chaos and
skepticism.

A person can only claim to have a

particular sensation or perception.

Nothing more can

be said about the data {Schaeffer, 1968b).

No
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generalizing or theorizing is admissible using purely
empirical dictates.10

Counterpoint: Science as Operationalisrnll
Eve stated "science is not reality . . . it is, at
best, a good approximation of reality--a model of it"
(Stein, 1993, p. A-21).

Gordon Clark (1964) believed

that science only provides models or heuristics of the
real world.

Although he disavowed pragmatism as a

comprehensive test for truth, he maintained that
science solves problems and that is all.

He noted that

multiple models of the same phenomenon may have the
same explanatory power, for instance, the wave and
particle theories of light (Clark, 1964; Poincare,
1905/1990).
Clark noted that all sciences are like geometry in
that they start with axioms (presuppositions) .

Because

lO Scientists seem to miss the point that Humean empiricism led to
Kantian agnosticism.

The real world (the thing itself) is forever

Wlknowable.
11 Operationalism is only one of the many nonrealist views of
science (see also Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Laudan, 1990; Van
Fraasen, 1980) .
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of these presuppositions, science never completely
describes real-world entities.
quite amazing.

Clark's conclusion was

No scientific law has ever described

any real event!

Nor can it.

To show that scientific law, specifically the laws
of Newtonian mechanism, do not describe how
phenomena occur, the example of the pendulum will
be used.

The law of the pendulum, roughly

expressed, states that the period of the swing is
directly proportional to the square root of the
length.

But the scientific methods by which the

equation is
assumptions.

obtai~ed

are based on three remarkable

First, the

~ass

cf the bob is

assumed to be concentrated at a poinc; that is,
the body is homogeneous.
met in actuality.
tensionless.

This condition is never

Second, the string must be

There is no such string.

And third,

the pendulum is supposed to swing on an axis
without friction.

This is impossible.

necessary conclusion therefore is that

The
t..~e

scientific law describes only non-existent
pendulums, and that real pendulums do not move in
accordance with the laws of physics. [italics
added]

(Clark, 1964, pp. 137-138)
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c.

S. Lewis made a complementary argurnent in his

book, Miracles (1978).

He showed that the laws of

nature have never caused anything.
table for his example.

He used a pool

The law of conservation of

momentum describes what will happen if the cue ball is
hit a certain way, but no law can describe how or if it
will be hit.

In this way, the so-called laws of nature

are shown to be only sketchy illustrations:
never causal.

they are

Clark's and Lewis' arguments, taken

together, depict a science that can only discover
regularities in nature and this only with the
constriction of a priori presuppositions (see Table 6).

Table 6
Clark and C. S. Lewis on the Laws of Nature
Gordon Clark:

No scientific laws have ever described
any real world events.

c. s.

Lewis:

No scientific laws have ever caused
anvthing.

Operationalists note that a scientific concept is
not an all-compassing descriptor of reality; it is
merely a set of operations.

In psychology, no

diagnostic index of depression, for example, is ever
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equal to what any person ever experiences as
depression.

A test may measure "MMPI-depression" or

"Beck-depression,• which do not exist as real-world
entities; but these instruments never measure the real,
felt depression that individuals experience.
The insights provided by the cperationalist
critique mesh with the discussion of the idicgraphic
and nomothetic above.

When one strives for nomological

generality, individual cases are not covered.12
The operationalist assessment of naive realism is
important to the dialogue between theology and the
other sciences.

If no hard and fast laws of nature

exist in the Newtonian sense, then supernaturalism
cannot be said to defy the laws of nature.

Value-Laden Science
Bergin (1981) and Ellis (1981) debated in The
Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psvcholoay over
whether the inclusion of values was appropriate in
psychotherapy.

They discussed whether any values could

be scientific.

12 Or, group means obscure individual differences {R. K. Bufford,
personal communication, 1988) .
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Interestingly, Ellis adopted two (possibly
discordant?) models of rationality to evaluate how a
person should behave.
"Is it verifiable?•

Ellis used a positivist cannon:
He also used an egotistical one:

"Is this what I really want?"

Both of these notions of

rationality are values (Evans, 1989).
Indisputably, scientific enterprises are valueladen.

Psychotherapist's values are prescribed by law

and inscribed in state licensing regulations.
Basic researchers in all the sciences have values
as well (Moreland, 1989) (see Table 7).

These values

Table 7
Ihe Axiology of Science: The Values of "Value Free•
Science
Communal Sharing of Data

Academic Honesty

Skepticism

Objectivity

Peer Review

Ooenness to Refutation

are not always written as are the values of the
licensed practitioner above, but they are very
important to progress in research laboratories and
institutions.

Those who violate these norms may be
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shunned by their colleagues, not attain tenure, or be
refused for grants (Moreland, 1989).
Evans (1989) argued that psychology cannot operate
at all without a value-critical stance.

Practicing

psychologists reinforce or discourage thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors that they see as "unhealthy."
Also, to practice psychotherapy without reference to
implicit opinions about the meaning of life, human
nature, or the freedom or bondage of the will, for
instance, is impossible.

Furthermore, a coherence

between the values of the therapist and client/patient
is a major factor affecting psychotherapy outcome
(Bergin, 1987) .
Still, despite the facts, psychologists and other
scientists often Yow value neutrality.

When pressed,

they may refer to the positivist social science of
Auguste Comte.

Positivism in the Human Sciences
In 1830, Comte proposed that social science (as
well as the rest of the sciences) be founded on firmly
positivist ground.

He was very optimistic that the

positivist approach that he inherited from his mentor,
Saint Simon, was adequate to explain all social

Crime and Evil
36
phenomena as well as all of life itself (Mathisen,
1990).
The term "positive• has here the sense of that
which is given or laid down, that which has to be
accepted as we find it and is not further
explicable; the word is intended to convey a
warning against the attempts of theology and
metaphysics to go beyond the world given to
observation in order to enquire into first causes
and ultimate ends. (Flew, 1979, p. 283)
Comte's positivism actually became a religion, and
positivist societies were organized for "worship• in
France.

Comte may be distinguished as one of the great

early fathers of social science.

However, his

assertion that positive laws of behavior could be
constructed cannot be substantiated.

To say that no

metaphysical statements are allowed in social science
is self-refuting because, obviously, this statement is
metaphysical (Popper, 1963).
Positivist social science has the unique honor of
being able to explain everything, except everything.
As noted above, empirically-derived positivist theories
cannot be used to generalize beyond specific phenomena
(i.e., no theories are possible).

Deductively-derived

Crime and Evil
37
positivist arguments never apply to any one case.
Wolfhart Pannenberg noted:
The price to be paid for such a reduction of the
traditional cultural sciences to theories of
general structures and to approaches capable in
principle of mathematical formulation is indicated
by Ke.'ttpski's remark that science thus defined
merely describes a •field of possible action" from
which real action is excluded. . .

Deductive

nomological arguments . . . cannot in themselves
supply the real cause of any particular event
~>'hich

requires explanation. (1973/1976, pp. 121,

141)

Naturalism: The Hidden Assumotion in Scientism
Schaeffer noted that the Western world is now a
post-Christian culture (Schaeffer, 1968b).

Belief in

science as the arbiter of all truth has filled the void
left by the collapse of Christianity as the predominant
Weltanschauung.

This is especially ironic because the

Christian world view has forcefully been argued as what
made the birth of modern science possible (Merton,
1938).
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The atheistic and naturalistic presuppositions
that science has adopted for the last 150 years are now
seen to be essential to the ver<I continuation of
science.
Histor:y of

Sagan, in his preface to Hawking's
T~,

~

sounds like an apologist for atheism,

not at all like an objective reviewer (1988).
Strangely, and contrary to the opinions of the
founders of science, current scientists often see
atheism as a prerequisite to scientific progress.

For

instance, Gennan chemist Walter Nerst stated that
denying the infinite duration of time would be to
betray the very foundation of science (Jastrow, 1978).
Eddington's emotional attachment to the idea of a
universe without a prime mover is obvious:
I

have no axe to grind in this discussion [but}

the notion of a beginning is repugnant to me .
I

simply do not believe that the present order of

things started off with a bang

. . the expanding

Universe is preposterous . . . incredible . . . it
leaves me cold. (Jastrow, 1978, p. 102)
Jastrow, an eminent astrophysicist and a religious
agnostic, pondered why these objective investigators
are so emotional:
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I

think part of the answer is that scientists

cannot bear the thought of a natural phenomenon
which cannot be explained, even with unlimited
time and money.
science.

There is a kind of religion in
Every event can be explained in a

rational way as the product of some previous
event; every effect must have its cause; there is
no First Cause . . .

This religious faith of the

scientist is violated by the discovery that the
world had a beginning under conditions in which
the known laws of physics are not valid. and as a
product of forces or circumstances we cannot
discover. (1978, pp. 103-104)
Jastrow's description of scientism is that of a
failed religion--failed, not because science is not
useful within limits, but because overzealous
proponents have inflated it beyond its explanatory
power.

He noted that •it is not a matter of another

year, another decade of work, another measurement, or
another theory• (p. 105) .

Science has no hope of

lifting the curtain on reality.
Scientism is self-refuting.

Scientism claims that

only what can be known scientifically can be known at
all.

Because this statement cannot be known
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~cientifically,

it is inadequate as a test for truth.

Moreland calls this the •myth of ostrich scientism-that needs to be laid to rest" (1989, p. 101).

Jobnson•s Critique of Naturalism
Naturalism is the idea that all phenomena have
natural causes; nothing can be supernatural.

Johnson

(1991, 1993) noted that naturalism is often used to
prove itself in a circular fashion.

In this way, for

example, nee-Darwinian theory is used to prove
naturalism.

Assuming naturalism, evolution is perhaps

the best answer to the question of how life came to be.
Then, evolution, which assumes naturalism, is
fallaciously advanced as proving that only naturalistic
explanations of origins are plausible.
Johnson contends that scientific naturalism is not
science at all because it does not subject itself to
the possibility of falsification.

No hypotheses are

advanced that if falsified could diminish the view that
the whole cosmos must be explained without reference to
the supernatural (Popper, 1963).
Naturalism is deemed true by definition.
that may falsify naturalism cannot exist.

Such

Evidence
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research is deemed •uninteresting and generally
unpublishable" (Johnson, 1991, p. 152) .13

Science's

Self·I~zae

The antirealist critique of realist science is
successful in that it shakes the edifice of science as
an omnipotent, sole arbiter of truth.

Scientists need

to re-examine their view of meaning because
observations are paradigm-dependent and because
reductionism, scientism, naturalism, and positivism are
inadequate tests for t::-uth (Apel, 1967; Gadamer, 1982).
Perhaps science needs herr.teneutics to enable it to
~ncerstand

itself and

~ts

subject (Dilthey, 1989).

Also, as noted, science is of ten prone to
religious (or as currently, irreligious) zealotry.
Perhaps, a sound hermeneutic can supply the tools to
save science from this dogmatism (Pannenberg,
1988/1990).

l3 See also Plantinga (l993bl on "Darwin's Doubt.•

To erect a

science, especially psychology, on top of naturalism is impossible
because one mus.t remain agnostic about the verisimilitude of
reason if reason was produced by blind chance.
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The Indispensability of Hermeneutics in All Science
Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation.
Hermeneutic "is connected with the name of the god
Hermes, the messenger of the gods who announces their
decisions• (Pannenberg, 1973/1976, p. 157).

Plato

contrasted the hermenes (interpreters) of Horner with
those who merely recited it.

Also, Aristotle's Es:J::.i..

Hermeneias is titled De Interpretatione in Latin.
According to Kuhn (1970), interpretation or
hermeneutics is always needed in science because raw
data do not exist and facts do not speak for
themselves.

Whenever data are gathered, they are

gathered inside an interpretative framework.
observation is not so simple.

Simple

In Kuhnian terminology,

all observations are paradigm-dependent.

Moreland

added, "Seeing something is not a passive matter of
receiving stimuli on one's retinae.

Rather, seeing

involves seeing as or seeing that; it involves an
interpretive element• (1989, p. 147).
In psychology and the social sciences,
hermeneutics is all the more important.

When

interpreting human behavior, not just the interpretive
framework of the data gatherer is at issue.

The human

subject performs his or her behavior in the milieu of
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his or her

O\o/Il

personal and social context.

"There are

no i!llll1aculate perceptions" (Evans, 1989, p. 52).

The

observer-status of a scientist or practitioner is not
just influenced by negative biases that need to be
discounted or factored out.

Some observers may

understand some phenomenon that is opaque to others.
Often observers need to be trained to notice and
accurately report a phenomenon.

For instance, a

religious psychologist may better understand the
psychology of religion (Evans, 1989).

Theology as Science

Is Theology a Science?

Moreland (1989) noted that theology and the other
sciences are alike in the way they formulate and test
hypotheses.

Historically, theology was considered a

science, even the queen of the sciences.
However, since Schleierrnacher, theology has been
thought of as the study of subjective religious
experience (1799/1988).

To remedy this, Wolfhart

Pannenberg (1973/1976) strove to place theology back on
equal footing with other academic departments in the
university.
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Pannenberg postulated Christian theological
propositions as real-world descriptors of reality:
each hypothesis needs to stand or fall on its own
merits.

Helmut Thielicke also thought theology was a

science (1992).

Barth agreed, but would not make

theology submit to narrow definitions of science

(Wissenschaft)

(Barth, 1962).

Millard Erickson (1985) agreed with Barth that
theology has its own internal consistency, tnat it
advances with a consistent method, and that it deals
with objective data (see Table 8).

Moreland (1989)

added that theology does in fact make predictions from
its data and retrodictions (explanations of past
phenomena) just like other sciences (see Table 9) .

In

short, theology describes the real world just as well
as any other science.
Mortimer Adler (l990b) argued that the unity of
truth implies that theological study produces the same
kinds of knowledge that other scientific disciplines
produce.

He rejected as Averroeism the recent views of

Joseph Campbell and others that religion is mythic and
contains only poetic truth.

The scholastic and

Averroeist views of truth will be further discussed
below.
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Table 8
Theology's Coherence (based on Moreland, 1989)
1. Theology has a definite subject matter.
2. Theology deals with the objective, not just with
subjective feelings.
3. Theology has a definite methodology.
4. Theology has a method for verifying its
propositions.
S. There is a coherence among its propositions.

Table 9
Theolcgy's

Ccr~esno~Ce~ce

with Rea:ity

1. Theology abides by the cannons of logic.
2. Theology is communicable.
3. Theology uses scientific methods.
4. Theology makes predictions and retrodictions.
5. Theology shares subject matter with other sciences.

Sacra Doctrina Versus Scientific Dialogue
The abstract possibility of theology being a
science might not bother too many investigators.
However, if theology were to lay claim to the right to
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enter into academic dialogue with other sciences, many
scientists would become nervous indeed.
So first, the limits that the traditional sciences
place on theology will be discussed.

Then, whether

theology can converse equally with the other sciences
will be ascertained.
Harvey Conn noted how science •shakes up•
hermeneutics to provide what he called "distancing."
This keeps theology from reifying its conclusions.

He

wrote:
Extrabiblical disciplines have also initiated the
irritation process that leads to distancing.

The

behavioral sciences--psychology, cultural
anthropology, linguistics, sociology,
communications--are more and more shaking the
cloistered world of the theologian and the church
member.

And out of this engagement, this

intersection, new reexaminations are taking place
in the hermeneutical spiral. (1988, p. 205)
Conn also noted that this irritation process makes
many Christian people uncomfortable.

And some have

opted for making scripture an independent authority.
This parallels St. Thomas' elevation of theology beyond
the pale of other human inquiry.

The investigation of
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scripture, in this model, yields a sacra doctrina which
cannot be questioned.

This sacra doctrina is extant

today in the religious antipsychologies of Adams
(1970), Hunt (1987) and others.

Har;ey Conn, a

colleague of Adams, continued:
One of the dangers in this kind of response is
that it can split apart the Word of God in the
Bible (special revelation) from the Word of God in
creation (general revelation) .

Is not creation

also a continual source of God's truth (Ps. 19:1;
Romans 1:20)?

Car.not wise men and women, touched

by the Spirit,

~lso

unlock divine truth through

disciplined study of the

cr~ation?

The

henneneutical task, after all, does not allow us
to isolate the world we live in from the world of
the Bible. (1988, p. 205)
Because no science should be elevated to sacra
doctrina status, all sciences were created equal and
can affect all other sciences via henneneutics.
Perhaps theology has the right, even the logical
necessity, to dialogue with the other sciences.
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Theology's Place Among the Sciences
Theology and the other special sciences are prone
to dogmatism and imperialism.

Only a critical look at

the special sciences through the lens of the philosophy
of science can keep science from becoming pseudoscience.
Dualistic views of science are false and
unhelpful.

The human science approach is constructive

if one realizes that all science that is done by humans
is in part a human science.

Thus all sciences require

hermeneutics.
No single definition of science exists.

All such

definitions are meta-scientific and hence
philosophical.

Science is theory-dependent and value-

laden.
Not only is theology a science, but all science
(as well as all human endeavors) is religious.

A two-

fold position (religious and regular) to truth is
unhelpful and misleading.

This bifurcated epistemology

of science should be avoided.
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An Augustinian Epistemology of Science

Intecrration of Psychology and Theoloay
If nothing else, the preceding discourse has shown
that the nature of science is a meta-scientific
question.

Furthermore, Copleston, the Thornist scholar,

argued that no friction exists between theology and the
sciences per se.
In general, the relation of science to religion
and theology is not one of acute tension:

the

tension which in the last century ·.ias o::ten
alleged to exist between them does not really
exist at all.

The theoretical difficulty arises

rather in regard to the relation of philosophy to
theology. (1985, p. 424)
An adequate philosophy of science makes the

integration cf the sciences possible.

No science

should be excluded from the debate a priori.
In studying the phenomena of crime, for instance,
sociology, psychology, neurology, theology, penology,
and jurisprudence may all have legitimate contributions
to make.

Further, the work of one special science may

either confirm or contradicc the conclusions of
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another.

This tension indicates that further

investigation is necessary (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980).

Darwin's Solution
The early Charles Darwin was apparently aware of
the impending division between theology and biology
that his work might cause.

Interestingly, Darwin cited

Francis Bacon in the preface to his Origin of Species:
Let no man out of a weak conceit of sobriety, or
an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that
a man can search too far or be too well studied in
the book of God's word, or in the book of God's
works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let men
endeavour an endless progress or prof icience in
both. (1859/1990, p. xil
This research will argue that Darwin was correct
in appealing to both special revelation and God's
creation as foundational for his investigation.14

1 4 Plantinga noted that belief in God is properly basic (i.e., one
may have epistemic warrant to believe in God) at least under some
conditions.

This avoids the trap of having to prove a basic

presupposition via the methods of classical foundationalism
(Plantinga, 1983; l993a; l993b).
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Whether he actually used the method he advocated is
doubtful, but a critique of the Origin is outside the
scope of this work.

The Modern Confusion of Reason
Modern thought straddles between rationalism and
irrationalism (Bloesch, 1992; Plantinga, 1983).

The

failure of rationalism to deliver what it promised has
caused many thinkers to shift to irrationalism.

As

Francis Schaeffer (1968b) called it, a "line of
despair• was crossed.

Since this "escape from reason,"

morals, absolutes, beauty, and goodness have been
reduced to matters of taste (Schaeffer, 1968a).
According to Schaeffer (196ab), Kierkegaarde was
the first to cross this line of despair.

More

recently, Martin Heidigger (1968) redefined thought as
that which goes beyond the rational.

In his What is

Called Thinkina, he asserted that despite all of our
apparent thinking we are still not yet thinking.
According to Heidigger, this is because since the time
of the pre-Socractic philosophers, reason has turned
away from the thinker.

Krabbendam (1980) offered a

similar, but decidedly Reformed analysis.

According to

Krabbendam, the-rationalism/irrationalism dichotomy is
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a pseudoproblem developed by humanity turning
theoretical thought in an apostatic direction.
In antiquity, Augustine (1952) avoided positing a
dichotomy between theology and the other sciences by
postulating •credo ut intelligam• (I believe in order
to understand).

To Augustine and to Anselm (1969)

after him, no bifurcation in theoretical thought
existed.

He was free to •spoil the Egyptians,• that is

to adopt any and all valuable elements in the world as
a person of faith.

He wrote:

For, as the Egyptians had not only the idols and
heavy burdens which the people of Israel hated and
fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold
and silver, and garments, which the same people
when going out of Egypt appropriated to
then~elves,

designing them for a better use.

(1990, p. 737)

The Reformers and the Better Use of Reason
Martin Luther distinguished between the
ministerial and magisterial use of reason.

When reason

is used magisterially, it is made absolute.
Contrawise, the ministerial use of reason is reason
serving faith (Bloesch, 1992).
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John Calvin noted that the knowledge of God and of
creation (in this case, ourselves) are a unity:
Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed
true and solid wisdom, consists almost entirely of
two parts:

the knowledge of God and of ourselves.

But as these are connected by many ties, it is not
easy to determine which of the two precedes, and
gives birth to the other. (1536/1990, p. ll

On Averroeism
Mortimer Adler described how Averroes, the A=abic
interpreter of Aristotle in the middle ages, reconciled
his faith ar.d the deliverances of reason.

According tc

Adler, Averroes proclaimed •there were two different
bodies of truth:

on the one hand the truths of faith;

on the other hand the truths of reason.

These two

bodies of truth existed in what might be called 'logictight compartments'" (1990b, p. 24).

The Relioious A Priori of All Theoretical Thouoht
Thomas Aquinas, also a medieval interpreter of
Aristotle, adopted a different line of thought that was
ultimately no more helpful.

In the Summa Theoloaica I,

1, 5, St. Thomas (1990) asserted that sacra doctrina is
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a science, but it is nobler than the "profane"
sciences.

He believed that theology was the regina

scientarium (the queen of the sciences) and that all
other branches of knowledge serve theology:

the

secular sciences are the handmaidens of theology.15
Aquinas claimed exegetical verification for elevating
theology by allegorically interpreting Proverbs 9:3.
Wisdom has "sent out her maidens, she cries out from
the highest places of the city."16 17
Dooyeweerd posited that the elevation of theology
to an other-worldly preeminence by the scholastic
theologians was a syncretism, melding Greek and
Christian thought:

"The whole conception of the so-

called sacred theology as the regina scientarium was of
Greek origin• (1960/1980, p. 115).
This dualism lifts theology above and pits it
against the other sciences.

The same forced dichotomy

can be found in the other Greek dualisms:

form/matter,

15 a.ocilla r:.heologiae.
16 The New King James Version.

17 See Ramm (1954) on allegorical interpretation in the Middle
Ages.
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substance/accidents, and phenomena/noumena, for
instance (Spier, 19S4/1979).
In St. Thomas' use of the term sacra doctrina,
theology is raised to the rank of a supernatural
science exceeding all other sciences both in dignity
and certainty of knowledge (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980) .
AqUinas surely thought he was rendering theology a
great service; instead, he uncoupled all scientific
endeavors from the Word of God.

Can Th:;;_g_locry Domir.ace Science?
All the data of creation must be open to
theoretical ir.quiry.

Some thinkers attempt to use

theology, itself a science, to regulate the other
sciences, while at the same time, keeping theology
above the fray.
This fact

Spier noted:
. is sometimes ignored, as in the

case when the attempt is made to erect a Biblical
or religious psychology or anthropology from
Biblical data exclusively.
works scientifically.

We must examine God's

We must reflectively

contemplate all of created reality and must focus
our attention upon the cosmos itself. (19S4/1979,
p.

9)
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No one particular science can provide the framework for
integrating other sciences, including psychology and
theology.
These fundamental theoretical problems exceed the
boundaries of all special sciences.

They are of a

philosophical character, since their solution
requires a theoretical total view of our temporal
horizon of experience.

Can Christian dogmatic

theology as such provide us with this
philosophical total view? (Dooyeweerd, 1960/1980,
p. 129)
If so, then theology is no longer a science at
all.

It can no more provide a total view than biology,

economics, or organic chemistrJ (Snoke, 1991).
Making theology the taslanaster over any other
aspect of creation or mode of inquiry is actually
idolatry (Romans 1:25).

Any view, even a

so~called

Christian view, which makes this central and radical
sense of God's Word (or even general revelation, i.e.,
the creation) dependent on theology, is unbiblical in
its very fundamentals.
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The Reliaious Root of Scientific Thouaht
As noted previously, all scientific activity

betrays some religious commitments.

God's living word-

revelation to humanity cannot be the object of any
single science; it is instead the central starting
point of all human endeavors.
According to Dooyeweerd, as long as humankind's
ear was open to God's general revelation (phanerosis),
he or she was able to understand the world in all its
diversity as being the one creation of God.

But now,

epistemological dualism has affected all thinking about
science.

Dooyeweerd wrote:

By ascribing to

t~e

so-called natural reason an

autonomy over against faith and the divine
revelation, traditional scholastic theology merely
gave expression to the false Greek view of reason
as the center of human nature. (1960/1980, p. 140)
All science needs to be erected on the foundation
of a radically Christian philosophy of science.

The

only other choice is a foundation of apostasy and
fallacy.

A philosophy of science made to conform on

the surface with certain proof texts or ecclesiastical
doctrines would not be rendered harmless.
would only be a pseudointegration.

The result
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The question is not whether a science should be
philosophically founded.

It already is.

The only

question is which foundation to build upon (Spier,
1954/1979) .
Rushdoony (1960/1980) noted that humanity creates
a monster when it deifies science.

In Bultmann's

(1958) thought, for instance, science is first
uncritically accepted as part of his program of
demythologizing.

Ironically, Bultmann later becomes

wary of science as a source of evil.
Instead, the consistently Christian view, which
refuses to idolize any aspect of creation including
reason or science, can deliver a faithful and true
science.

"The view thus which seemingly 'rejects'

science becomes the only source of true science,
whereas any view which makes absolute that which is
relative ends up by destroying the value of that aspect
of creation and emasculating life and experience"
(Rushdoony, 1960/1980, p. xv).
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£§.ychology Coram Deol8
Archimedes reputedly said, "Give me a fixed point
and I will move the earth."

On adopting the only

adequate Archimedean point, Spier (1954/1979) wrote:
No one can occupy a position outside of himself.
Our starting point may not be separate from
ourselves, because it must be the starting point
of the philosophy in which we are actively
engaged. .

Such an Archimedean point is to be

found only in the heart or the soul of man . . .
The heart or soul of :nan may never be identified
with any of our vital functions such as feeling or
faith.

It is deeper than any vit.al functicn, for

man transcends in the bond with God all temporal
created reality.

The heart is the point where the

whole human existence concentrates itself, where
man determines his relationship to God. (pp. 1617)

Dooyeweerd and Spier nowhere attempted to define
the heart, since it is the deepest (created)
presupposition.

Dooyeweerd also noted that the choice

lS Coram Deo (Latin, in the presence of God) .
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of the Archimedean point is not an academic endeavor:
it precedes all scientific activity.

The Cross-Traffic Amoncr Psychology. Theology and the
Rest of the Sciences
Psychology is a scientific enterprise.

As such,

it must be unde:;;,stood in the context of all the
sciences.

It uses idiographic and nomothetic methods

to study its subject; it has attributes of the natural
and human sciences and must use hermeneutics and be
value-critical in order to access meaning.
As a science, psychology cannot be positivistic,

caturalistic, or scientistic without being internally
contradictory.

It may be empirical but must avoid the

empiricist fallacy.

It cannot provide the investigator

with absolute reality, but it' can deliver models of
reality.

Instead, psychology is inherently religious.

Like all human enterprises it has a religious root or
radix.
Theology is also a scientific activity; hence,
theology is an equal partner with the other special
sciences.

No human enterprise can be arbiter of truth.
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No human endeavor, theology included, can be allowed to
become the mediatorl9 of all truth.
Augustine's view of truth is more cogent than
Averroes' two-fold division of reality.

"For to the

concept of truth belongs the unity of all truth, that
is, the simultaneous existence, without contradiction,
of each individual truth with all other truths"
(Pannenberg, 1988/1990, p. 169).
The recent revolution in the philosophy of science
has made science's pretheoretical commitments,
including its religious character, explicit.

:f

psychological science is characterized by a neglect of
God at its very root, that a.lone is enough to expleti:-.
psychology's general neglect of evil as a subject of
study.
The view of science developed here makes the
inquiry into both crime and evil possible.

If evil is

part of the data set of human experience, then the
scientific investigation of evil is possible.

Such an

inqui::y requires the tools· of theological science.
Theologians have produced some significant results in
their study of evil.

In the next section, these

19 There is but one mediator {l Timothy 2:5).
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theological results will be consulted conjointly with
other scientific data pertaining to criminological
psychology.

As this investigation ensues, an attempt

will be made to pre·rent any one special science from
ascending as regina scientarium.
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CHAPTER 3

THEORY: CRIME, EVIL,

A.&.'ID

HUMAN NATURE

The Scientific View of Crime and Evil

A forensic psychology that has rejected absolute
scientism, positivism, and naturalism is emancipated to
view humankind in general and criminals in particular
as moral agents who have broken the moral law.

As

noted in chapter 2, this is episterr.ologically
legiti~atc

and ir. keeping

philosophy of science.

~ith

currant advances in tne

Also, as noted above, this is

consistent with the conunon-sense attribution that
criminality is both pathological and morally wrong.
Furthermore, adding a theological analysis
broadens the scope of inquiry and is more commonsensical.

Because theology is a science, adding a

theological analysis to the inquiry makes it no less
scientific.
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Crime and Eyil Examined
Although psychologists are called upon to render
opinions about criminals, neither the term crime nor
the term evil are part of psychological or psychiatric
nomenclature.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manua1

(DSM-III-R) has no diagnostic category or
epidemiological data on either criminals or evil-doers,
per se (American Psychiatric Association [APA] , 1987) .
!n DSM-III-R, however, several diagnoses are
closely related to criminal behavior.

Antisocial

Personality Disorder (APD) and Conduct Disorder in
children are characterized by criminal conduct.
Several of the paraphilias, most notably Pedophilia,
cannot be diagnosed without a crime having taken place.
Impulse control disorders such as Kleptomania and
Pyromania necessitate theft and arson respectively'.
Furthermore, other seemingly neutral mental disorders
may be considered causal of various criminal acts.
Schizophrenia, Affective Disorders and several
Personality Disorders are often cited as inducing
criminal behavior (Meloy, 1992).
Criminality is not a psychological term.
be investigated psychologically, however.

It can

The quasi-
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psychological character of criminality will be
discussed after crime and evil are briefly explained.
The idea of causality in criminal behavior will
then be investigated.

The argument will be that evil

may be admissible as a scientific cause of crime.
Then several current psychological and psychiatric
theories of criminality will be presented.

Even though

some of the theorists responsible for them profess a
positivist agenda, the intent will be to show that they
all implicitly contain the idea of hunian evil.
Last, some of the insights of theological
anthropology will be introduced to make explicit what
has been ir:lplicit.

That is, evil and crime must be

explored together to cle2.rly understand the phenomenon
of criminal behavior.

Crime Defined
The fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica defined crime as "the intentional commission
of an act usually deemed socially harmful or dangerous
and specifically defined, prohibited and punishable
under criminal law• (1992, p. 736).

The penal codes of

various jurisdictions and the several law dictionaries
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use similar definitions (Black, 1991; Deering's
California Penal Code, 1985).
The two common compilations of crime incidence and
prevalence data in the U.S., the Unifo:r:m Crime Report
(UCR) and the National Crime Survey (NCS) limit their
definitions of crime to several •index crimes.•20

This

is done both for methodological reasons (i.e.,
definitional unifo:r:mity) and to describe the crimes
that matter most to researchers, law enforcement, and
the general public.
Walters (1990) in his psychological study of
"lifestyle criminality• also limited his research to
what he called •patterns of serious criminal conduct."
To specify a rather narrow definition of crime is
necessary in order to say anything meaningful about it
at all.
Narrow definitions of criminality yield both pros
and cons.

On the one hand, to know how murder and

mayhem relate to driving three miles an hour over the
speed limit or taking pencils from work would be
interesting.

However, these minor infractions are

20 The OCR index crimes are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
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impossible to measure.

The indetectability and prima

facia triviality of petty crimes does not mean that one

should reify the useful distinction between serious and
minor offenses.

A relationship across the criminal

continuum may still exist (Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1987).
For practical purposes, forensic psychologists and
sociologists of crime define crime specifically.
study dealt with severe, chronic criminality.

This

The

diagnosis of APD, the psychological construct
psychopathy, a!ld the criminal personality as conceived
by Yochelson and Samer.ow were used to

exa...~ine

the

phenomenon of crime (APA, 1987; Hare, 1980; Millon,
1985; Yochelson & Samenow, 1976).

Evil

Defined

Evil behavior, as defined by the dictionary, is
any action that is •morally bad or wrong; wicked"
(American Heritaae Dictionary, 1992).

Psychologists

are often uncomfortable with discussions of evil, and
some still advocate value-free science (Ellis, 1981).
This is an inconsistent assertion because it is a value
preference.
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Some investigators allude to Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle in their defense of a morally
neutral science.

They argue that because reality is

fundamentally indeterminate, only subjective values are
scientifically defensible.

Mortimer Adler disagreed.

The fact that the ontological determinateness of
the electron's position and velocity is not
measurable by physicists and so is of no interest
to them does not mean that it has no real
existence, any more than time not measurable by
physicists lacks reality.

The substitution of the

word •indeterminacy" for the word •uncertainty"
indicates the illicit conversion by the Copenhagen
school of a subjective into an objective
probability. (1990b, p. 72)
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not mean that
reality is ontologically indeterminate; only that it is
sometimes epistemologically uncertain.
A close reading of the proponents of value-free
psychology reveals that they do promote one set of
values over another.

currently, to extend Freud's

analysis of development and blame the patient's parents
is popular (Forward, 1989).

This changes the time and

place of the wickedness, but not its existence.
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Furthermore, psychologists are required by
professional ethics

codif~ed

both by the APA and by

state regulations to make moral and ethical judgments
about themselves and others (Sales, 1983).

To agree

that moral and ethical standards are binding among
colleagues and then assert that they are irrelevant to
the society at large is inconsistent.
A complete exposition of current ethics and how
one decides what is right and wrong is outside the
scope of this inquiry.

However, Geisler (1971) noted

absolute moral relativism is at an intellectual
deadend because relativism logically leads to amoral
nihilism, which necessarily concludes that no act is
morally better or worse than any other.

A general

consensus exists among ethicists that at least some
acts are morally better than others.

Moral and ethical

distinctions are not altogether meaningless (Lewis,
1990).
In order to determine what is right and wrong,
psychologists need to consult state-of-the-art academic
work in jurisprudence, ethics, and moral theology.
Even if these sources of truth are unwisely ignored,
the concept of human evil will find its way into
criminological psychology of its own accord.

Katz
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(1988), in The Seduction of Crime: Moral and Sensual
Attractions of poinq Eyil, documented a secular
criminology of temptation, a drive to do

evil·~or

evil's sake.

The Quasi-Psychological Nature of Criminality
Psychologists work with criminals, but being a
criminal does not make one a mental patient.
Criminality is a multidimensional problem with
individual, societal, economic, moral and other facets.
The psychological analysis of criminality may be the
most important (Eysenck, 1977).

However, investigators

in various fields of knowledge have a legitimate
interest in criminology.

This is why psychologists

need to recognize the quasi-psychological nature of
criminality.
Edwin Shneidman's (1993) work on suicide provides
an appropriate illustration because suicide is a crime
in many jurisdictions.

More importantly, like

criminology, suicidology is done by investigators in
many fields.

Shneidman, a psychologist, argued that

suicide is not understandable as a psychological
phenomenon alone (see Table 10) .
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Table 10
Various Contemoorary Aoorcaches to Criminolocv in
General and Suicidology in Particular
Shn~iQ.rnan'

§!

L~vel~

of

Analv.:;iq in Suicidolocrv

R~~~iar~h~r§!

Usina

of C:drr.e(Bvil

~hneidrl'an•.:;

Life Historv

Sarnenow (1984)

Personal Documents

Abrahamsen (1985)

Dernoaraohic/Eoidernioloaical McCord

&

Levels

McCord (1964)

Philosoohical/Theoloaical

Staub (1989): Hick (1977)

Sociocultural

Montaqu (1976)

Socioloqical

Farrinaton2:

Dvadic and Famil''

Elizur & MinuchiZJ. (1989)

Psvchiatric

Millon (1985); APA

Psvchodvnamic

Melov (1988; 1992)

Psvcholoaical

Hare (1980): Sarne now (1984)

Constitutional

Wilson

Bioloaical/Biochemical

Raine & Dunkin (1990)

&

(1987)

Herrnstein (1985)

Shneidman noted:
the most evident fact abouc suicidology and
suicidal events is that they are multidimensional,

2l Barnett, Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington (1992).

--
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multifaceted, multidisciplinary--containing, as
they do, concomitant biological, _sociological,
psychological (interpersonal and intrapsychicl,
epidemiological, and philosophical elements.
(1993, p. 56)
In a similar way, any theory of criminality that
attempts to describe crime as it occurs in vivo should
account for crime's quasi-psychological character,
including its metaphysical and theological elements
(e.g., the existence of real evil).

A

robust

criminological theory must account for the evil that
criminals do.

The Causes of Crime

Etiology
Several recent investigators have sought to of fer
large scale, comprehensive psychological explanations
for severe criminality (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989;
Walters, 1990; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985).

Finding the

cause of crime has become a cause celebre.
The idea of causality in psychology is itself very
complicated.

Perhaps one's view of causality functions

as an unexamined assumption that affects the
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conclusions of the investigation.

The word cause is

cormnonly used e'!Uivocally (Adler, 1990a).
Interestingly, the concept of etiology (or
aetiology) now used in medicine and psychology was
first used criminologically (Liddell & Scott, 1968).

'

.

For instance, in the New Testament, azrza is used of the
charges against Jesus Christ and Paul (John 18:38; Acts
25:19,27)

(Arndt & Gingrich, 1957; Gingrich, 1965).

"In its legal sense it was used to point out where the
responsibility lay• (Adler, 1990a, p. 120).

F;:i.nds of Causes
Hippocrates (1990) believed that all diseases had
both hwnan and divine etiologies.

Bonhoeffer (1971)

dismissed this idea as limiting God to being a "God of
the gaps.•

Moreland (1989) noted that Bonhoeffer's

objection is irrational because all of science is
plagued by many such gaps with no apparent weakening of
its prestige.

The notion of human and divine causation

has been with both psychology and medicine from the
beginning.
Hippocrates (1990) also divided causes into
predisposing and exciting factors.

This simple

distinction helps clarify the current psychological
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notion of etiology by separating the concepts of
diathesis and stress.
Aristotle developed the Greek notion of etiology
best in the pqsterior Analytics (1990b).

Here, he

enumerated four different kinds of causality:
material, formal, efficient, and final (see Table 11).

Table 11
Etiology Accordina to Aristotle
'typ!il§l

Qt:

ll.b:i:i!tQtglJ.an

ShQ!il

P§lV!:;hQlQg;i.l:;al Examo!e

Ex::imnle

~S!Y§l~§l

Material

Leather

IBioloqical Orqanism

Formal

The Pattern

The Design Plan

Efficient The Shoemaker

rt'he Agent or Subiect

Final

The Behavioral Puroose

The Shoe's Puroose

Aristotle's distinctions express the different
conceptions of cause implicit in discussions of the
causes of crime.

The criminal is a human being who was

designed by God (or evolution, for that matter) to be a
normal person.

Ideas of good behavior and
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psychological wellness presuppose the concept of proper
function (or formal cause) .22
The material cause is the biological organism as
he or she exists when the crime is committed:

the

material cause may include any biochemical or
neuroanatomical equipment and all previously learned
behavior.
The efficient cause is the moral agent with the
capacity to act, delimited, of course, by the other
causes.

The final cause is the reason or purpose of

the activity as apprehended by the agent and/or by God.
As Wilson and

Herrnstei~

(1985) noted, the

question of what causes crime, nature or nurture, is a
poorly phrased query.

Causality in psychology is at

least as complicated as causality in medicine
(diathesis/stress) .

The concept of cause or etiology

should not be used naively.
Cause has several meanings.

Logically, a single

cause of crime will be impossible to find.

The word

cause needs to be specifically defined in each context.

Otherwise investigators will find themselves working at
cross-purposes.

22 See Plantinga, Warrant and Prooer Function (l993a) .
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Theological causality, advanced by both
Hippocrates and Aristotle, should be admitted today.
Also, classical use of cause rescues the idea of
purposive behavior and moral agency while preserving
the role of material causality.

Psychological Nosology of Crime: Four Theories

The number of theories of criminality probably
equal the number of researchers and practitioners
studying criminals.

Psychological theories can be

divided into two basic classes, those that attempt to
explain specific criminal

ac~s

{like pedophilia, arson,

serial homicide, etc.) and those that attempt to
explain criminality in a more general way.
Following is an exploration of four current
psychological theories of criminality (see Table 12) .
Cleckley (1941) first described psychopathy as it is
currently construed.

Two basic streams of psychopathy

research are extant today:

the work of Robert Hare

(1980) as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check List
(PCL) and psychoanalytic psychopathy (Meloy, 1988;
1992).

Antisocial Personality Disorder is current

psychiatric terminology and was influenced largely by
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the personality research of Theodore Millon (1990).
Also, the work of Samenow (1984) and Yochelson and
Samenow (1976) is discussed.

Their construct, the

criminal personality, is often used in correctional
settings (Thaler, 1991; Weinstock, 1990).

Table 12
A Groupina of current Forensic Psvcholoaical Theories
of Criminality.
Th~Qri~!:;

The,..,rv

I

Hare (1930)

Cleckley' s Psvcho'Oathv

Meloy (1988)

Psvchoa:calvtic Psvchonatb"

Millon (1986)

A.."ltisocial P-ersonality

Same now (1984)

Criminal Personality

I

Psychopathy
Cleckley (1941) sketched the currently accepted
portrait of the psychopath.

He brought together

earlier research on psychopathic inferiority and moral
imbecil~ty

and formulated the concept of the

psychopathic personality.

Cleckley's construct heavily

influenced the first edition of the DiagnQstic and
Stai:;isi:;ical Manual of Mental Disorders (American
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Psychiatric Association [APA], 1952).

DSM-II, III, and

III-R have moved toward a broader, more inclusive
category with the

diagn0~is

Antisocial Personality

Disorder, which is discussed below (Eysenck, 1986;
Millon, 1986) .
Pinel (1801) used the term

~.anie

san delire to

describe impulsive, criminal offenders who lacked the
delusions of the typical mental patient.

Pritchard

(Thaler, 1991) and Rush (1812/1972) characterized
severe criminals as morally blameworthy, with Pritchard
originating the term •moral insanity.•
About one hundred years ago, Cesare Lombroso
(1968) described severe criminals as atavistic throw-

backs to earlier evolutionary development.

His view

combined some currently accepted criteria of
psychopathy (lack of conscience, aggressivity, and
insensitivity to social criticism) with the now
discredited notion that criminals possessed a kind of
visually discernible "Neanderthal" look (McCord &
McCord, 1964).
Goring used statistical analyses to discredit
Lombroso's physical criteria.

He demonstrated that so-
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called atavistic physical features23 were just as
common in a sample of college students 24 (Meloy, 1988;
Yochelson & Samenow, 1976).
Koch was the first to describe severe criminals as
psychopathic, and Birnbaum used the tenn sociopathic,
terminology that is still accepted psychological
nomenclature (Meloy, 1988; Thaler, 1991).

Psychopathy

and sociopathy are often used synonymously (Reid, Dorr,
Walker, & Bonner, 1986).

Cleckley (1976) described

sixteen clinical signs of psychopathy (see Table 13).

23 Not all physical traits are unrelated to criminality.
Mesomorphy (muscular build) is significantly associated (Wilson &
Herrnstein, 1985) .

Meurological substrates are disputed:

some

studies note cortical immaturity and bilateral slowing of
electroencephalograms.

Studies of brain damaage in adult

criminals may be confounded by dzug abuse and head trauma, which
are ubiquitous in this population.
24 Genetic sequelae are outside the scope of this study.

Walters

and White (1989) recently performed a meta-analysis of 38 studies.
The better designed studies showed the least effects.

Crime and Evil
80

Table 13
Cleckley's Sixteen Indicators of Psychopathy
l.

Superficial charm and good intelligence

2.

Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational
thinking

3.

Absence of nervousness and other psychoneurotic
manifestations

4.

Unreliability

5.

Untruthfulness and insincerity

6.

Lack of remorse and shame

7.

Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior

8.

Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience

9.

Pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love

10. General poverty of major affective relations
ll. Specific loss of insight
12. Unresponsiveness in interpersonal behavior
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and
sometimes without
14. Suicide rarely carried out
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated
16. Failure to follow any life plan

Currently, Hare and Meloy are producing a
continuous stream of research on psychopathy (Gacono,
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Meloy & Heaven, 1990; Hare, 1965, 1966, 1970, 1980,
1985; Meloy & Gacono, 1988).
Cleckley's tradition.

These researchers follow

Hare (1980) wrote as an

atheoretical general psychologist and has
operationalized Cleckley's psychopathy with his
Psychopathy Check-List (see Appendix Cl.

Meloy, a

psychodynamic theorist, has written extensively on
psychopathy.

He retained Cleckley's view but

classified psychopathy as a variant of Narcissistic
Personality Disorder (Kernberg, 1984).
Forth, Hart, and Hare (1988) noted that only 1520% of incarcerated felons meet the criteria

io~

psychopathy as operationalized in the Psychopathy Check
List.

Even so, Hare and McPherson (1984) opined that

they cow.mit a disproportionately large number of
serious crimes.
Hare explained psychopathy as a cluster of
personality traits and behaviors.

He listed

irresponsibility, impulsivity, hedonism, selfishness,
egocentricity, low frustration tolerance, lack of
guilt, remorse, or shame, and a chronically unstable
and antisocial lifestyle as diagnostic of psychopathy.
Psychopaths are also selfish, callous, and exploitative
in their use of others, and often become involved in
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socially deviant behaviors.

According to Hare, these

traits and behaviors appear in psychopaths without the
attendant signs of other mental illness or deficiency
(Hare & Jutai, 1983).
Hare (1970) noted that the personality structure
and life history of the psychopath are quite different
from those of the person whose antisocial or criminal
behavior results from living in a criminal subculture.
Unlike the psychopath, these individuals may be capable
of forming strong, affectionate relationships and of
experiencing concern and guilt over their behavior.
Meloy (1988; 1992), on the other hand, linked
psychopathy with the other character or personality
disorders.

He and other psychodynamic researchers note

that, like the other personality disorders, the general
factor in psychopathy is narcissism (Gacono, 1990;
Gacono, Meloy, & Heaven, 1990).
Hare's factor analytic studies of the PCL can be
interpreted in accord with Meloy•s opinion that
psychopathy is an aggressive variant of narcissistic
personality.

Two factors have been identified.

Factor

1 measures •a selfish, remorseless and exploitive use
of others."

Factor 2 describes an unstable, antisocial
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lifestyle and is more behavioral (Harpur, Hare &
Hakstian, 1989, p. 6).
Psychopaths are among the most treatment resistant
of all psychological patients.

This may be due to

their lower than normal levels of distress and their
perceptions that nothing is wrong in their behavior
(Hare, 1970).

Nevertheless, some studies have shown

that the behaviors of some psychopaths seem to become
less grossly antisocial with age.

Other studies have

shown that psychopaths actually remain criminally
active longer than other criminals (Hare & Jutai,
1983) •

.R.>1Y.choana l yt i c Psychgoa th?

Psychologists and psychiatrists, beginning with
Freud, have theorized that crime is a result of
superego deficits.

Although Freud was never optimistic

about using psychoanalysis to treat character disorders
(Freud, 1939/1990), his followers adapted his
techniques to treat criminality and other personality
disorders (Hartmann, 1940).

Lowen (1985), the Reichian

analyst, believed psychopathy is a variant of
narcissism.

He seemed to believe that he could

successfully treat all character disorders.
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Newer, nee-analytic explanations may hold more
promise for understanding and treating character-level
pathology, including psychopathy.

The ego and self

psychologists (Kernberg, 1984; AOhut, 1971), as well as
the object-relations theorists (Hamilton, 1988, 1992;
Winicott, 1953), propose an active faculty that
organizes reality into cognitive schema.
These cognitive templates are both interpersonal
anu affect-laden (Kendall & Braswell, 1993).

Yochelson

and Samenow•s (1976) criminal thinking patterns are
also other-directed and are linked to feeling states.
This explains the cross-fertilization of ideas between
nee-dynamic theories of psychopathy and related
cognitive-behavioral theories (Meloy & Gacono, 1988) .
Meloy posited that psychopaths never achieve
object constancy, the bedrock of socialization, and
that their need for normal attachment is deactivated.
Instead, he hypothesized that psychopaths identify with
what they perceive as an aggressive parent.

They view

their parents as the enemy and internalize what
Grotstein (1982) called the stranger self-object.

This

fantasy of a predator that the infant introjects is
what he or she will eventually become (Meloy, 1988).
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Like the narcissist, the )Sychopath is conceived
as having moved beyond borderline object relatior.s:
the sense of "I" and "not-I" is intact.

"The manner in

which self and its relation to others is conceived,
however, is distorted and exaggerated, reflecting the
fusion of self- and object concepts" (Meloy, 1988, p.
51).

Meloy added that psychopathy •predisposes,
precipitates, and perpetuates the expression of
predatory violence" (p. 191).

He distinguished between

predatory and affective aggression.

The forrner is

characterized by decreased autonomic arousal and lack
of affect, the later by incense sympathetic arousal.
The object relations extensions of psychoanalytic
theory do not repudiate earlier constructs.

Meloy also

described superego deficits in psychopaths.

He used

Kernberg's levels of superego pathology as diagnostic
of the severity of psychopathy (Kernberg, 1984).
Severe psychopaths •will verbalize full knowledge of
the moral requirements of society, but do not
understand what it means to internalize such standards"
(Meloy, 1988, p. 313).
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Antisocial Personality Disorder
The term Antisocial Personality Disorder is the
current nomenclature of the American Psychiatric
Association's Diaanostic and Statistical Manual (1987).
APD was adopted in 1968 with DSM-II (see Table 14).
Like all DSM categories, the diagnosis of APD is
given by matching the person to a list of behavioral
descriptors.

In general, DSM-III-R assigns somebody to

a discrete category.

It was not specifically designed

to describe the person's current thought patterns,
emotional processes, or psychodynamics.
much broader term than psychopathy.

Also, APD is a

Reid, Dorr,

Walker, and Bonner (1986) noted that 78% of all
incarcerated felons could be diagnosed with APD.
The way APO differs from criminality and
psychopathy is illustrative of the nosological
differences between psychological and psychiatric
assessment in general.

Hare (1970) believed that

because discrete diagnostic categories (like APD)
require exact assignment into one and only one
diagnosis, they are more difficult to support than
dimensional

conceptualizat~ons

Eysenck (1986) concurred.

like psychopathy.

He believed that the current
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DSM categories abandoned validity to achieve diagnostic
consensus (i.e., interrater reliability).

Table 14
Synopsis of Diacrnostic Criteria for APD
Pre-morbid Prerequisite:
Eighteen years of age or older and previous diagnosis
of Conduct Disorder.

An Ar.tisodal Lifesty\f;. characterized by (4+) :

1.

!nconsister..t work behavior

2.

Dis::egard for socier.al norms of legal behavior

3.

Assaultiveness

4.

Failure to honor financial obligations

5.

Failure to plan ahead or vagrancy

6.

Lying, aliases and conning

7.

Recklessness and disregard for safety

8.

Disregard of parental responsibilities

9.

Lack of monogamous relationship for one year

10. Lack of remorse for injury to others

Not Due to Psychotic Disorder;
This antisocial behavior not due to Schizophrenia or
Manic episodes.
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The dimensional view, or psychological view,
describes traits as they exist on a continuum (Eysenck
& Gudjonsson, 1989).

The question is, "How much of

this characteristic is present and what other traits
are present with it?•

Whereas the question in the DSM

is, "What discrete disease entity is present?•
Millon believed that even discrepancies in
theoretical approaches will lead to breakthroughs in
classification.

In Toward a New Personology, he

provided some historical perspective:

"For the most

part, traditional nosologies were the product of a
slowly evolving accretion of clinical experience,
fostered and font'.alized by the systemizing efforts of
respected clinician-scholars such as Kraepelin (1899)"
(1990, p. 102).
Millon believed that the adoption of his view of
personality disorders is a great advance.
this with scientific progress.

He equated

Millon and Klerrnan, in

Contemporary Directions in Psychooathology: Toward the
DSM-IV, wrote:
A change in the character of psychopathology has
begun to evolve in the past decade.

Slow though

progress may be, there are inexorable signs that
the study of mental disorders has advanced beyond
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its earlier history as an oracular craft.

No

longer dependent on the intuitive artistry of
brilliant clinicians and theoreticians who
formulated dazzling but unfalsifiable insights,
psychopathology has acquired a solid footing in
the empirical methodologies and quantitative
techniques that characterize mature sciences.
(1986, p. ix)
Others, like Hare, Hart, and Harpur (1991) had
reservations about the direction that psychiatric
classification is taking.

Eysenck agreed:

"There is

little likelihood that the DSM-!V will show any
improvement on the scientific procedures •JJhich have led
to the scientifically disastrocs DSM-III" (1986, ?·
74).

In the DSM-IV Uodate, the American Psychiatric
Association (1990) noted that Antisocial Personality
Disorder will be the Axis II diagnostic catego:::y "most
likely to undergo major changes" (p. 5).

Multisite

field trials are now under way (Hare, Hart, & Harpur,
1991).
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Criminal Personality; A Coqnitive-Behavioral Theory
Directive, cognitive-behavioral treatment regimens
are currently popular in criminal justice settings
(Weinstock, 1990).

Stanton Samenow wrote:

Despite a multitude of differences in their
backgrounds and crime patterns, criminals are
alike in one way:

how they think.

A gun-toting,

uneducated criminal off the streets of southeast
Washington, D.C., and a crooked Georgetown
business executive are extremely similar in their
view of themselves and the world. (1984, p. 20)
Yochelson and Samenow (1976) argued that criminals
think differently from normal people.

As a group, they

are characterized by inaccurate thinking.

Yochelson

and Samenow believed that the most important difference
between a criminal and a noncriminal is his/her
distorted cognitive process.
Orling (1991) has recently developed the
Cognitive-Style Questionnaire (CSQJ to operationalize
Yochelson and Samenow's theory of distorted criminal
thinking.

The CSQ is a 289-item, Likert-scaled

instrument.
Yochelson and Samenow•s writings have been
critiqued as being full of hyperbole and overstatement
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(Weinstock, 1990) .

Sometimes their work sounds like a

diatribe against criminals.
Like the work of Cleckley, this is a case-study
oriented approach.

However, some research is now being

conducted to test the Yochelson and Samenow hypothesis
(Thaler, 1991; Walters, 1990).

Following is a

representative list of criminal personality
distinctives.
Energy
Yochelson and Samenow noted that the criminal is
extremely energetic, both physically and mentally.
They hypothesized that this activity is not just random
rr.ania but, instead, is purposeful and goal directed.
Yochelson and Sarnenow contended that this excitability
is not due to a neurological deficit, but :i.s under the
criminal's conscious control to "make life more
interesting and exciting" (1976, p. 256).
Fear
The criminal is afraid primarily of two things:
physical injury and injury to his or her self-esteem.
Yochelson and Sarnenow (1976) believed that these fears
are unlike neurotic fears or simple phobias in that the
criminal does not admit them.
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Corrosion and eutoff
Criminals do have methods for modulating their
fear and other negative affects.
•corrosion• and •cut-off."

They can use

Corrosion is gradual, and

cutoff is nearly instantaneous.

Both are alike,

however, because both methods are used by criminals to
talk themselves out of being afraid and into committing
a crime.
Corrosion, according to Yochelson and Samenow, is
a gradual, conscious desensitization process that
criminals use to reduce the fear that could deter them
from committing a crime.

Walters (1990) called this

same process mollification.

To mollify (or corrode)

their consciences, offenders utilize any and all
methods and devices to gradually rationalize their
crimes or at least to mitigate against responsibility.
Sometimes the victim or society is blamed.
times the crime is minimized out of existence.

Other
Walters

cited Dobson's (1989) interview of serial killer Ted
Bundy and noted:
Bundy refers, not once, but twice, to the women he
"has harmed," which seems a gargantuan
understatement in light of the fact that he
sexually abused, killed, and mutilated nearly all
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of his victims.

In summary, mollification entails

an effort by the lifestyle criminal to assuage,
exonerate or extenuate responsibility for his
violent and antisocial activities, which may or
may not be true, but which have nothing to do with
the individual's own behavior. (1990, p. 133)
Cutoff is used for the same purpose, but is
invoked almost instantaneously.

This fear cutoff

mechanism is, like corrosion, hypothesized to be under
the offender's volitional control.

Oftentimes, a

particular piece of profanity is used to trigger a
cutoff (Walters, 1990; Yochelson & Samenow, 19i5).
Even though cutoff is so rapid and automatic, it is
hypothesized to be a habit under. the criminal's
control.
~

This is conunon to all hwnans, but Yochelson and
Samenow wrote about a severe variant that results in
criminality.

They posited that unlike anger in normal,

responsible people, the criminal's anger •metastasizes"
(1976, pp. 268-269).

It escalates naturally when the

criminal's desires are blocked and results in actingout behavior.

This anger is not globally directed
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against society or authority figures unless they
frustrate the criminal's wishes.
~

This is not the
well done.

sa.~e

as feeling good about a job

In contrast, criminal pride •corresponds to

an extremely and inflexibly high evaluation of oneself
[it] is rigid in that it preserves a self-created
image of a powerful, totally self-detennining person•
(Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, pp. 274-275).

This

rigidity is maintained in order to prevent the
encroachment of the feared zero state.25
Criminals often are self-aggrandizing to the point
of ridiculousness and megalomania.

They :nay attempt

superhwran feats which result in severe injury.

Others

have been known to become professional impostors.

For

example, Waldo Demara successfully posed as a
psychologist, a philosophy professor, a surgeon, a
prison guard, and a minister (Coleman, Butcher, &
Carson, 1984).

25 Zero state is conceptualized as a feeling of low self-esteem
and abandonment.

This may be a common factor in Personality

Disorders (Kernberg, 1984).
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Power Thrust;.
The "power thrust" (Yochelson & Samenow, 1976) is
the criminal' .s maladaptive response to compensate for
the zero state.

In a power thrust, a criminal acts out

his or her fantasy of pride or omnipotence, usually in
an interpersonal situation.

It is an attempt to undo

the zero state and reestablish an acceptable selfimage.
When criminals use the power thrust as a coping
response, they are displaying two thinking errors.
First, they are overcompensating

~y

and feelings cf worthlessness with
grandiosity.

replacing thocghcs
~nbridled

Second, they are usually ex."libiting

callous disregard for others.

Yochelson and Samenow

conceived of this criminal will-to-power as a narcotic;
it is the only antidote to the criminal's empty self.26
•criminals crave power for its own sake, and they
will do virtually anything to acquire it.

Insatiable

in their thirst for power and unprincipled in their
exercise of it, they care very little whom they injure
or destroy• (Samenow, 1984, p. 98).

26 The view of evil as pride can be seen in Schuster (1987) and
Peck (1983), as well as in the theology of Strong (1899).
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All criminal behavior is by nature exploitive and
manipulative and, hence, a power thrust, according to
Yochelscn and Samenow.
is one power thrust

Sexually controlling behavior

exa.~ple

they noted (1976).

Another

class of power thrusts proposed are those of speech.
Criminals of ten misuse polysyllabic words to make
themselves seem more intelligent, or "if his usage is
correct, it is often pretentious.

The criminal may use

flowery language to appear suave and debonair"
(Yochelson & Samenow, 1976, p. 280).
Walters (1990) noted that the criminal's tendency
to oscillate between the power thrust and the zero
state is a form of cognitive rigidity that one would
expect to find in an adolescent.
The repeat offender has resisted the societal push
for increased self-discipline through responsible,
internalized action and remains at a point in his
development where external control and influence
are viewed as predominant.

Consequently, the

world view of most criminals is inunature,
unsophisticated, and largely fatuous in that it
focuses on a solitary dimension of human
experience (strong versus weak). (1990, p. 139)
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Sentimentality
This is described as "the Robin Hood syndrome" or
the •one helluva fella" fallacy by Walters (1990).
Sentimentality is the criminal's tendency to allege
soft-heartedness, aesthetic interest, or a certain
circumscribed morality.
In prison, certain crimes (e.g., rape, child
molestati~n,

and being an informant} are taboo even to

the most hardened convict.

Also, even violent

offenders exhibit a soft spot.

Yochelson and Sarnenow

noted that criminals retain these lacunae in their
criminality in orde=

~o

be able to say that they are

basically a nice person.
Ted Bundy, in his pre-execution interview with
Dobson portrays himself as the normal "guy next door":
Basically I was a normal person.

I wasn't some

guy hanging out at bars or I wasn't a pervert.
was essentially a normal person.

I had good

friends; I lived a normal life; I wasn't perfect
but, I want to be quite candid with you, I was
okay.

Okay I was. (Dobson, 1989)

Dobson was professionally interested in Bundy in
order to document the role pornography played as a
causal factor in the genesis of a serial killer

I
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(Dobson, 1989).

Walters believed that Bundy's agenda

was to provide that information in order to exonerate
himself by shifting the blame to an outside agent
(i.e., the obscene material).

Walters concluded that

Bundy's goal was to take Dr. Dobson on a •sentimental
journey• (1990, p. 143).
Religion
Yochelson and Samenow (1976) described a
religiosity that is in service of an offender's
criminal intent.

Allport's (1950) research described a

religious orientation that can be either extrinsic
(directed toward some other, ulterior motive) or
intrinsic, the converse.

The criminal/religious factor

that Yochelson and Samenow described appears to conform
with Allport's extrinsic religious orientation.
Yochelson and Samenow believed that for criminals,
their religion "has not evolved beyond their childhood
forms,• and "the criminal lacks the concept of religion
as a way of life or as an ethical system.
that a few concrete acts
person• (1976, p. 294).

He believes

. . make him a religious
A criminal merely uses his or

her religion as a way to atone for previous offenses.
At the same time, he or she is planning new ones.

This
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behavior may actually take on the form of a

religiou~

"monastic phase" (1976, p. 299).

Evil Inherent in Severe Criminality

Attribution of Evil Implicit in the Four Theories
The theories exposited above all point to the evil
inherent in criminality.

Samenow•s theory is the most

open about its value judgments, but each of these four
paradigms ascribes evil to criminals.
Under a section titled, "Hatred and the Wish to
Destroy,• Meley wrote that psychopaths •may hate
goodne;:;s itself" (1938, p. J31).
common

a..~ongst

Burn::iut is said to be

therapists treating psychopaths because

of extreme countertransf erence issues (Weinstock,
1990).

Kernberg (1984) described the psychopath's

rralignant narcissism.
problerr~

Meloy (1988) detailed the

treating them:

therapists are to expect

sadism, manipulation, devaluation, denial, and
deception.

To this he added that real fear of assault

exists concomitantly with the intense negative
countertransference.

He also noted that this

countertransference is neither to be ignored nor
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analyzed away.

It should be heeded.

The evil inherent

in psychopathy is dangerous.
Hare's (1980) version of psychopathy also ascribes
evil to psychopaths.

The PCL describes them as

irresponsible, deceitful,

re.~orseless,

arrogant, and

promiscuous, for example.
APO criteria are lying, remorselessness, parental
irresponsibility, destruction of others' property,
forcing sexual activities on others, physical cruelty
tp animals and persons, and using weapons against
others as indicators of the disorder (APA, 1987) .
These behaviors are indicators of moral failure crossculturally (Lewis, 1947) .
Meloy (1988) claimed to defer any moral or
philosophical judgment on the aggressive behavior of
psychopaths.

He did suggest it as a topic for further

research, however.
Attempting to construct a positivist psychology of
crime is vain.

Insofar as it succeeds, it will only

produce theories which do not admit value judgments and
are inadequate to explain the richness (and the
depravity) of human behavior.
Criminals behave differently from noncriminals.
The theorists above admit that sometimes criminal
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behavior is overtly evil.

To clearly describe this

criminal behavior, the language of moral judgment must
be retained.

Criminal Human Nature
Some psychologists (as well as some of the lay
public) opine that criminals are altogether
(qualitatively) different from normals.

Others, like

federal prison psychologist Walters (1990), contend
that everyone commits some crimes; criminality is a
question of degree.

Stanton Sa.T.er.ow disagreed:

Those who hold such a view go a step further,
asserting thac we are all, in a sense, criminals
because we lie, lust and yield to temptation, but
it is absurd to equate the white lie of the
responsible person with the gigantic network of
lies of the criminal.

At some point we and

the criminal are very different.

He is far more

extreme in that crime is a way of life, not an
occasional aberration.

It is misleading to claim

that the criminal wants what the responsible
person wants. (1984, p. 21)
The question of whether all people are incipient
criminals or whether criminals are categorically
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different from noncriminals seems insoluble from the
extant psychological data alone.

Hall noted that "some

of the ablest people have been the greatest criminals"
(1945, p. 364) .

The quasi-psychological status of

criminality necessitates a broader inquiry to answer
this dilemma.

Therefore, the existence of evil will

now be considered more thoroughly.

The Existence and Proximity of Evil
The existence of evil may be readily apparent in
other persons, while at the same time defense
mechanisms may obscure one's personal responsibility
(Freud, 1939/1990) .

Emil Brunner (1950) noted that the

warp in humanity's understanding of a phenomenon may be
a moral problem.

He called this the rule of proximity.

In brief, Christian anthropologists view hwnans as
having been created in the image of God, but that
hwnankind fell from that pristine state.

In this

context Erickson explained the rule of proximity:
This is the idea that the effect of the fall upon
creation and upon perception of the truth is
greatest in those areas where the relationship
between God and hwnans is most directly :Lnvolved,
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and least where that relationship is not at all in
view. (1991, p. 540)
This principle explains another key difference between
the natural and hurran sciences described in chapter 2.
The human sciences may be contaminated by personal
blind spots.

The view that humanity is fundamentally

good or evil may be a projection of the investigator's
self-concept.

If humankind is prone to evil, then the

researcher may need to confront her own personal
immorality.

The

Inadegq~Q.f..£.QD.t.err.J;l_oraJ;·v

An!;;h;r...QR.Q]. ca i

ScieJll;;.,if i c

es

Nontheological views of hurran nature exhibit
serious shortcomings.

Saucy (1993) noted that while

naturalistic anthropologies may be able to account for
variety, they have no mechanism to account for
individual personality.

This makes the psychological

study of the individual self impossible.
Also, Reinhold Niebuhr (1941) demonstrated that
nontheistic anthropologies cannot deal with the issue
of hurran transcendence over nature.

Even when a person

describes himself as part of the natural world, there
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must be a part left out (one's self) to do the
explaining.27
A survey

9t

the concepts of Christian anthropology

germane to the psychology of criminality is included in
the next section.

Creation, the fall, human freedom,

and conscience are discussed.
C=eation in the Image of Gqd
Riccur (1967) noted that the story of Adam in the
Garden of Eden is superivr to other ancient creation
accounts.

This is because it accounts for evil as

real, it dispenses with ambiguous dualistic notions of
evil, and it links evil to human responsibility.
The Bible states that Adam was created in the
image (tseleml and likeness (deJIT'Jth) of God (Genesis
1:27).

This image was not a donum superadditum, an

added gift, but was inherent in the original creation.
Martin Luther (1958) noted the terms image and likeness
are not different, but are a form of Hebrew
parallelism.

Calvin (1536/1990) added that the image

is still present in humanity; it is only marred.

27 For a critique of Niebuhr's views, see Carl Rogers (1962).
Klooster (1964) analyzed Niebuhr's existentialism, i.e., that sin
is equal to finiteness.
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Some expositors view the image of God as being
explicit in the near context (in Genesis l and 2).
They believe, for instance, that Adam and Eve were
created to be creative or that the image occurs in
their maleness and femaleness (Barth, 1962).

Although

Barth's gender interpretation may be far-fetched
(Gerstner, 1962),

the interpersonal implications of

creation in the image of a triune God are
inescapable.28

Others see that participation in the

Imago Pei means that hurrankind is like God in more
general ways, perhaps as an intellecting being
(Aquinas, 1990).
The idea of personhood, as currently construed in
Western thought, owes its existence to Christian
theology (Erickson, 1991) .

The debates about the

personhood of Christ provided the vocabulary and the
concepts which made the elevation of the individual
person possible (Pannenberg, 1977).
The implication of the image of God in humanity
is, first and foremost, that people were designed by
God and are of great value.

Second, "the image is the

28 The interpersonal (trinitarian?) nature of personality is
evident in many diverse psychological theories (White, 1961) .
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powers of personality which make man, like God, a being
capable of interacting with other persons, of thinking
and reflecting, and of willing freely" (Erickson, 1985,
p. 513).

Also, creation in the image and likeness of God
implies that the human race is responsible to God the
Law Giver.

Implicit is a universal standard of right

and wrong as part and parcel of human nature.
The precepts of the natural moral law must be the
same for all human beings, everywhere and at all
times, if they are inherent in human nature and
discoverable by our understanding of what is
really good and right for human beings to seek and
to do.

This is tantamount to asserting that there

is only one sound, moral philosophy, one that
directs each of us in leading morally good lives
regardless of our individual and cultural
differences.

I am willing to make that assertion

without hesitation. . . .

There cannot be a

plurality of incompatible moral doctrines all
prescriptively true. (Lewis, 1947, p. 87)29

29 Lewis (1947) also presented evidence for the agreement of moral
codes, which he called the Tao.
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The doctrine of creation implies human purpose,
the possibility of wholeness, and a real right and
wrong.

God is the designer or formal cause of the

individual person.
Tbe Fall as an Explanation of Evil
Evolutionary expositions of evil, like the process
theology of Teilhard de Chardin (1955), describe evil
as the necessary byproduct of progress.

Thus, process

thought redefines evil as only apparently bad (Alsford,
1991).

First, this is pantheism (or panentheism) with

its attendant difficulties (Geisler, 1976).

Second, it

trivializes suffering and dces not coincide with what
most people mean by evil.
Some versions cf Irenaean theodicy
critiqued from this perspective.

~ay

also be

John Hick (1977)

described evil as the necessary byproduct of "soulmaking. •

C. S. Lewis (1970b) emphasized the Irenaean

approach in The Problem of Pain.30
The Augustinian view of evil "shares with the
!renaean an emphasis on human-freedom and

30 Wilson (1990) reported the reaction of Lewis• colleagues at
Oxford.

Lewis' argument exposed the inconsistency of those who

expect God to correct all evil consequences in real time.
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responsibility, but sees the imperfections and evils of
creation as a result of, not a prerequisite of, such
freedom and responsibility" (Alsford, 1991, p. 124) .31
Paul's doctrine of the Old Man in Romans 6-7
illuminates the personal dimension of human evil.

In

contrast to the myth of human perfectibility offered by
positivist criminology, the Bible affirms that humanity
is fallen into sin (Romans 7:14).

Paul affirms that

humankind is radically affected by sin, that the
natural state of hu..'Tian affairs (the flesh) can do
nothing but serve the law of sin (Romans 7:25).
This is the doctrine of total depravity that was
emphasized by Calvin (1536/1990) .

Total depravity does

not mean that everyone is as bad as he or she might be
but that every facet of human nature is touched by sin.
In order to understand humanity most completely,
endemic evil cannot be ignored.
Human Freedom
The freedom and responsibility necessitated by the
fall are denied by many psychological determinists from

31 For a historical critique of the development of Augustine's
view of evil, with special reference to his view of sex as evil,
see Pagels (1988) .
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divergent schools of thought.

In Wisdom and

Humann~ss

in Psychology, Evans (1989) noted that the Christian
view of freedom is intellectually defensible.32

He

critiqued the reign of event causality (the view that
everything is caused by a previous event) and defended
the idea of agent causality33 (the view that persons
can be causes) .
Agent causality provides an escape from
determinism.
the Bible.

While novel to some, it is implicit in
God, a personal agent Himself, is sovereign

over all events, but Ee sovereignly decreed that human
Deings have actual responsibility (Brunner, 1950;
Edwards, 1992; Reid, 1983) .34

This Christian view of

actual moral responsibility is still extant in
jurisprudence, but, interestingly, has been largely

32 Libertarianism (unrelated to the political movement)

(Plantinga, 1990) .
33 This is equivalent to Aristotle's efficient cause cited above
and corresponds to the shoemake=

e~.a:nple.

3 4 Brunner's view of God' a sovereignty and hu:nan responsibility
clarifies the Reformed view.

See especially his historical

account of how Calvin and Zwingli fell prey to the natural
theology they dreaded (1950, pp. 303-353).
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banished from the other social sciences (Montgomery,
1975).
The Conscience
The Bible provides data for science but is not a
science textbook (Brunner, 1950; Morris, 1984).

This

conclusion applies to the science of theology as well.
The Bible does not set forth an explicit, systematic
anthropology.

For instance, it often does not use

anthropological terms, like soul, spirit, or
conscience, in a technical sense (Gundry, 1987; Jewett,
1971).
Most Christian theologians have assumed, however,
that this nomenclature does describe a real,
substantive, but immaterial part of human nature
(Aquinas, 1990; Moreland, 1993).

Some theologians have

attempted in recent years to reduce humanity to a
completely physical entity (Meyers, 1978).

This may in

part be a result of the theological trend to
dehellenize the New Testament in the last hundred years
to move it towards naturalistic monism (von Harnack,
1901/1958).
Data from current cognitive science support mind
as distinct from matter as well.

R.

w.

Sperry
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(1983),35 the neuropsychologist known for his
conunissurotomy studies, and Sir John Eccles (1984a,
l984bl, the Nobel prize-winning brain scientist, both
believe that their data imply mind/body dualism.
A full treatment of the mind-body problem is
outside the scope of this study.36

However, the Bible

does provide substantial information al:out these
constructs (Issler, 1993).
The Dible pictures the conscience not as an innate
moral code but as a God-given conscious sensitivity to
be consulted.
7o repeatedly ignore the promptings of conscience
will

des~usitize

the conscience's

regarding a given conviction.

pro~pcings

As blind persons

regularly use sandpaper to keep their fingertips
sensitive for reading braille, so those who wish
to pursue righteousness must be ever alert to the

35

Sperry is actually an epiphencmenalist, the view that a real

mind supervenes over matter.
36 See Body. Soul

and

Life Everlasting, (Cooper, 1989) for a

discussion of biblical and rabbinic views of the soul, and see
also Moreland' a (1993) criticism of epiphenominalism.
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promptings of conscience. (Issler, 1993, pp. 268·
269)
The dysfunctional conscience may be weak (1
Corinthians 8).

Or it may be seared (1 Timothy 4:2),

that is, deadened.37

Immanuel Kant, in a classic

passage, explained to have no conscience is impossible:
When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no
conscience,• what is meant is that he pays no heed
to its dictates.

For if he really had none, he

would not take credit to himself for anything done
according to duty. . . .

Unconscientiousness is

not a want of conscience, but the propensity not
to heed its judgment . • .

The duty here is only

to cultivate our conscience, to quicken our
attention to the voice of the internal judge, and
to use all means to secure obedience to it. (1990,
p. 375) (see also Appendix DJ
A clear view of the conscience is essential to
understanding its function in normal persons.

..

3 7 See (Hendriksen, 1979) on 1 Timochy 4:2.

This is

See also F. F. Bruce

,,,.
" 10ta.v
,,,. cruvE1011cnv,
"·
( 1984, pp. 353 • 356) on ic&ica.unip1a.crµEvoov
"t"T\V
che
cauterized conscience.
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true a fortiori in understanding the dysfunctional
conscience of the psychopath or other severe criminals.

Criminology Explained Scientifically
by Psychology and Theology

Christian theology and clear thinking help clarify
the theoretical issues surrounding the etiology of
severe criminality.

First, psychologists should

realize that criminality is a quasi-psychological
phenomenon.

Crime needs to be understood

psychologically, but

br~ader

perspectives on

criminality will add to, not detract from,
understandin3 crime.
Borrowing Aristocelian and Hippocratic language,
would-be criminals have various predisposing factors
(diatheses) that may incline them to criminality.
These factors (i.e., material causes) may, in part, be
the results of sins against them; that is, they may be
the victims of child abuse or sociocultural
deprivation.
genetic.

These predispositions may even be
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Criminals are still moral agents, however.

As

such, they are the efficient cause that actualizes
their criminality.
Because all persons are created in the image of
God (the design plan, or formal cause), they are
created to be righteous.

They retain that image even

in their fallen state and, hence, ought to be able to
act in accordance with that design.

Even now, they can

heed their consciences and receive the input necessary
to modify their behavior.
This means that their behavior is purposive.

The

final cause of criminal behavior is that criminals
believe that cri.xr.e will achieve some goal.

A return to

the classical view of causality with its volitional
implications makes psychological intervention possible.
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CHAPTER 4

PRAXIS: INTERVENTION IN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY

This chapter is built on the conclusions of the
two previous chapters.

Namely, that current advances

in the philosophy of science and the nature of science
allow for the scientific discussion of evil
concurrently with the scientific study of criminality.
This is the meta-theoretical foundation of this study.
As shewn, crime and evil ought to be invest:igated

simultaneously in order to best understand criminal
human nature.
introduced.

The Christian view of hti!!'an nature was
111e nature of etiology, conscience, and

freedom were discussed alongside current descriptions
of criminality.

The argument advanced was that this

expanded theory of human nature better describes
criminal phenomena because it better describes human
nature.
This section will move beyond theory to praxis.
The crime and evil construct will be used to examine
current issues in the psychotherapy and general
amelioration of severe criminality.
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Therapeutic Nihilism

Meloy (1988) described an oral tradition that
antisocial personalities are untreatable.

As noted

above, pronounced negative countertransference toward
severe criminals is likely.
possible:

The converse is also

some therapists believe that a therapeutic

alliance exists when none is present.

Therapists may

also be seduced by the lurid details of the crime or by
the infamy of the patient.

•consultation or

supervision is highly recommended" (Reid, 1986, p.
257).

Antisocial personalities are difficult to treat.
Like other personality disorders, the course of
treatment will be long, no matter what techniques are
used (Freeman & Leaf, 1989; Prins, 1986).
Gunderson noted several reasons for treatment
failure.

These include the APD patient's •tendency to

explain and discharge affects externally" and a
"distrust for authority• (1988, p. 347) .

Mcconaghy

(1989), a behaviorist, treated psychopathic patients
but noted that they cannot be trusted either to
continue in therapy or to make accurate self-reports.
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Conversely, Prins (1986) warned that the term
psychopathy can become a derogatory term, a kind of
psychological name-calling.

Terminology like

antisocial personality or psychopathy can become a
"dustbin" category, to which we have assigned all
those patients, residents, inmates, and offenders
who seem unwilling to be helped, are
unpredictable, unresponsive, and who, in addition,
may show aggressive behavior to a severe degree.
There is, of course, much truth in this, but it is
only a partial explanaticn. (p. 158)
Mental health professionals are likely to
experience a whole range of emotions while treating
severe criminals.

They may choose not to treat them at

all and apply their limited time and resources to
treating other patients (Gunderson, 1988).

This may be

due to the pervasive opinion that •nothing works" in
treating criminals (Martinson, 1974).

Recidivism and cure
Recidivism rates for incarcerated of fenders are
high.

No single, accurate rearrest rate for either

treated or untreated criminals is agreed upon, however
(Diiulio, 1991) .
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Comparisons across studies are difficult.
Different investigators use different definitions of
recidivism.

Sometimes recidivism means cow.mitting the

same offense; sometimes it means any new conviction.
Or, a parolee may be returned to prison for an
infraction that is not a crime for a citizen not under
court supervision.
This matter is further complicated for
psychologists because most offenses are not detected,
many detected offenses do not lead to arrest, many
arrestees are not tried, and many of those tried are
not convicted.

Also, even convicted reoffenders may

plead guilty to a lesser charge, making them appear to
have desisted their serious offending.
In short, recidivism is not equal to psychological
relapse.

Therefore, any measured reduction of criminal

behavior based on recidivism rates may be spoiled data
(Diiulio, 1991; Megaree, 1982) .
One conclusion of the longitudinal CambridgeSomerville youth study was that young offenders
receiving treatment actually became worse than the
control group (McCord & McCord, 1964).

Martinson

(1974) studied 231 treatment programs and concluded
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that •nothing works.•

Since then the efficacy of the

psychological treatment is suspect.38
Success rates for therapy in the community may noc
be much better.

Garfield and Bergin (1986) noted a

•rule of thirds• to describe therapy outcome.

One

third of clients get better even without treatment, one
third improve with treatment, and one third get worse
with treatment.

If the Garfield and Bergin iatrogenic

heuristic applies to forensic therapy, that could mean
that thousands of psychopaths are being made worse by
forensic treatment.

Some
reported.

treatmen~

successes with criminals are

Ross and Fabiano (1985) performed a detailed

analysis of successful and unsuccessful treatment
programs with offenders.

They argued that criminality

is related to delayed or impaired cognition (see Table
15).

38 Some treatments may work, the effects may just be immeasurable
because of the confounding nature of recidivism.

"Nothing works"

sounds more dramatic than •retaining the null hypothesis."
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Table 15
Outcome of Treatment in Inmate Proqrams With and
Without Cognitiv@ Components
QJ.lt!:;QID~

Effective

Tr~stm~nt

T~eatment

(94\)

10

(29%')

(6%)

24

(71%')

(100%)

34

(100%)

l

Total Studies 16

. 18.02,

NQll!::Qqllitivsi

15

Ineffective

x2

~Qgnitiv~

df "' 1, p

<

.001

They contend that interventions that decrease
recidivism39 address the criminal's disability with
interpersonal problem solving, critical reasoning,
meta-cognition, reflection, and values.
The directive and confrontative factor in
cognitive therapy may be the effective element in these
therapies _(Dryden

&

Ellis, 1988).

Samenow (1984)

directly challenged inmates to change their selfish

39 An alternative explanation to these data would be that
successful (i.e., cognitive) therapy makes for more stealthy
criminals.
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thinking.

Glasser (1965) also reported success with

his directive Reality Therapy at the Ventura School for
Girls.
Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies often
strive for narrow and circumscribed outcomes.

Thaler

(1991) listed the reduction of anger arousal,
threatening behavior, and anxiety, as well as the
increase of assertiveness as successful outcome targets
in criminal populations.

These are beneficial goals,

but they are certainly less ambitious than curing
psychopathy o::- eliminating

~riminality.

Reid ( 19 86) reported several di versicnary progra.rr.s
such as con"llr.unity-based corrections and wild.;:rness
experiences as being successful treatment for
antisocial personality.

Criminals in these programs

are likely to be less serious offenders, however
(Umbreit, 1985).

Hence, the prevalence of APD or

psychopathy in these groups is likely to be rather low.

The Ethics of Treatment and Punishment
Clinical psychologists working in forensic
settings are responsible to the patient, to society,
and to their profession (Sales, 1983).
by the state, however.

They are paid

Also, therapeutic ideals yield
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to custodial concerns, confidentiality is limited, and
dual relationships abound.

The most extreme example

may be when a psychologist is called upon to treat a
client to restore competency for execution (Megaree,
1982).
Weinstock (1990) reported another ethical concern.
He stated that recidivism rates might be lowered in a
way that runs counter to the values of a democratic
society and professional ethics.

Indeterminate

sentencing, that is keeping inmates incarcerated until
they meet therapeutic standards, has been reported to
lower recidivism rates.

Lewis elaborated:

The things done to the criminal, even if they are
called cures, will be just as compulsory as they
were in the old days when we called them
punishments.

If a tendency to steal can be cured

by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be
forced to undergo the treatment. (Lewis, l970a, p.
288)
Psychologists ought not allow their therapy to be
substituted for punishment just as psychiatrists cannot
ethically prescribe medication to punish (Toch & Adams,
1989).

Ethically speaking, aversive therapy requires

informed consent (Mcconaghy, 1989).
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This ethical problem results from a subordinate
view of humanity (Lewis, 1970a).

If humans are created

in the image of God and real good and evil exists, then
they are responsible for their behavior (see chapter
3).

The enlightened or "humanitarian" view that

considers all punishment as barbaric strips criminals
of their dignity (House, 1991) .
If the Christian view of humanity is lost, then
psychologists are reduced to "official straighteners"
{Lewis, 1970a, p. 290) .
We dernand of a cure not whether it is just bu=
whether it succeeds.

Thus when we cease to

consider what the criminal deserves and consider
only what will cure him or deter others, we have
tacitly removed him frora the sphere cf justice
altogether; instead of a person, a subject of
rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a
•case.• (Lewis, 1970a, p. 288)
Practically speaking, the results are
countertherapeutic as well.

~..a.king

psychotherapy the

final end, above the ideal of justice, reduces therapy
to a charade.

It will produce inmates who fake-good in

order to be paroled (Diiulio, 1991).

Furthermore,

faking good might be the rational thing for them to do.
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The decline of the idea of just deserts in
forensic psychology leads to the decay of forensic
psychology.

This decline results from the removal of

moral agency from the criminal justice equation.
Psychologists ought not insulate themselves from ethics
and justice.

The socially responsible and ethical

solution is to put the soul (psyche) back into
psychology (White, 1987) .

Restorative Forensic Psychology

A medical model of psychopathology has benefits.
Classifying human conditions helps explain
commonalities in etiology and provides insights into
remediation (Gunderson, 1988) .

The medical model may

be extended beyond its usefulness, however.

Chuck

Colson, president of Justice Fellowship (a prison
reform movement) and Prison Fellowship (a prison
ministry), described the confusion between evil
behavior and psychopathology; he observed:
During a recent trip to Europe, I met with a
psychiatrist in a model correctional institution.
She explained how 71 percent of the inmates there
had been classified as mentally abnonnal, or
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psychiatric cases, since they had committed
particularly heinous crimes.

Since people are

inherently good, the doctor inferred, anyone who
does evil must be mentally ill.

So imr.ates with

this "illness• were sent to her institution to be
•cured." (Colson, 1990, p. 170)
Fingarette (1988) noted a similar confusion in his
study, Heayy Drinking.

The bad habit, drinking

excessively, has been transformed into an illness.

He

noted that this transformation is bad science and moral
obscurantism.

The "diseasing• of imrates or drunkards

is cruel because it disables their ability to change.
Instead, they

m~st

look for the right doctor with the

latest cure.

They then only need to wait passively

while the cure is administered to them.
The perceived contradiction between moral behavior
and mental health may be a result of an oversimplified
popularization of Freud's theory that the restraint of
drives by moral oversight is •unhealthy.•40

4

° Freud sometimes appears

to hold this view.

Drives are

Other times he

advocated moral restraint (see Civilization and Its Discontents
[Freud, l929/l990] and the letters between Freud and Pastor Oskar
Pfister [Freud & Pfistar, l963]).
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seen as mechanistic forces that will be expressed one
way or the other.

The expression of drives is viewed

as natural and healthy; the repression of drives is
not. 41
The discovery of psychological regularities does
not mean psychological determinism.

The restoration of

mental and moral wholeness to serious offenders ought
to be the goal of forensic psychology.

Wholeness and Mental Hygiene
In contradistinction to the view that health is
equated with the discharge of instinctual drives, the
Judeo-Christian Scriptures advance an alternative view
of health.

Luck (1972), writing in the Tbeological

Dictionary of the New Testament, noted that health

'

' from which "hygiene• is derived) means
(uytVTJS,
soundness or balance.

He also described how the
,

I

translators of the Septuagint used uytVTJS to translate
shalom, the Hebrew word for peace.

41 The deterministic view that disease causes behavior is
problematic because it relies on simplistic notions of causality
(see chapter 3) .
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Umbreit (1985) adopted the word shalom (peace) to
develop his model of criminal justice.

Crimes are

sometimes called a disturbance of the peace.

Umbreit's

Old Testament criminology is designed to restore the
peace.
Brown, Driver, and Briggs (1979) document that the
Hebrew words for restitution and peace derive from the
same root.

Van Ness (1986) noted that under Hebrew law

offenders were considered responsible for their
actio~s.

Therefore, they were required to pay back or

recompense their victims.

This fine (a response cost,

in behavioral terms) was not paid to the state.
order to restore

th~~

In

peace in the ccmmunity, the victim

was paid restitution (Juscice Fellowship, 1989; Van
Ness, 1996).
"Response cost refers to the loss of a positive
reinforcer• (Kazdin, 1989, p. 153).

The most common

response cost in everyday life is a traffic fine.
Something positive the offender possesses (i.e., money)
is taken from him or her.

A synonym for response cost

is negative punishment (Karoly, 1980)

(see Table 16).
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Table 16
Response Cost in Relation to Other Behavioral
Techniques
froced11re
Positive

~Qngi!;;iQ!l

Introducing

,.,...nc:Pmlenci:>
Pleasant

Reinforcement
!Negative

Increased
!Behavior

!Removing

Unpleasant

IReinf orcement
Punishment

Resyl!;;

Increased
!Behavior

Introducing

Unpleasant

IDecreased
Behavior

!Response Cost

'Removing

Pleasant

:Oecreased
Behavior

Olinger and Epstein (1991) have argued that
response cost paradigms have been successful for
treating adolescent aggressive behavior in
institutional settings.

Sandler (1980) reported that

using overcorrection combined with response cost
quickly reduced institutional theft.
overcorrection is also found in biblical response
cost/restitution paradigms.

Old Testament offenders

were required to pay back several times the amount
stolen (Urnbreit, 1985).

In fact, the primary
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difference between behavioral response cost and
biblical restitution is that restitution specifies that
the fine be paid to the victim.
Restitution was a component of other ancient near
eastern law codes and suzerainty treaties (Archer,
1975; Johnson, 1987).

Johnson described the Hebrew

view of humanity represented in the Pentateuch; he
argued that the Hebrew view incorporated an elevated
anthropology compared to surrounding cultures.

For

instance, in ancient Israel capital punishment was not
required for property crimes because htanankind was
created in the image of God.
House

(199~)

docurr.ented the shift from paying back

the victim to •paying your debt to society."

King

Henrf, the son of William the Conqueror, referred to
the peace in his realm as the king's peace.

Any

offense to one's neighbor was now an offense against
the crown.

Under English common law and now in the

United States, a crime is a grievance against the
state.

This is seen in the language of legal dockets

that describe cases as "The State v. John Doe."
current victim's rights movement is an attempt to
balance this view (Sank & Caplan, 1991).

The

Crime and Evil
130
Umbreit (1985) noted that contrary to public
perception, in his state, 38% of all prison inmates are
inca~cerated

for nonviolent property offenses.

He

noted that diversion programs that include restitution
would reduce prison overcrowding; this would facilitate
the detention of more severe criminals.

Reduction of

overcrowding would provide a better therapeutic milieu
for treating psychopaths and other serious offenders
(Megaree, 1982; Weinstock, 1990).

Milieu Therapy for Severe Criminals
McCord ( 1982) noted son·

0

:0ue;cess in treating

antisocial personality with rr.i.1.L:u therapy.

Reid

described the interpersonal emphasis in milieu therapy.
"Great emphasis is placed on the individual's
responsibility for himself and others in the program"
(1986, p. 257).
Relatedly, Umbreit (1985) noted that the
offender's sense of personal responsibility is
increased in programs that require restitution.

The

psychological theories of criminality discussed above
describe the criminal's evasion of moral
responsibility.

This linkage suggests
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restitution/response cost studies as a possible line of
future research.42

The Superiority of Response Cost to Punishment
Karl Menninger (1968) described the retributive,
punishment-oriented penal system as criminal.

The

prcblerns with this view have already been noted:
compulsory psychotherapy by "official straighteners•
~ay

be more cruel than traditional punishment.
A softer reading of Menninger is instructive.

Punishment rr.ay work.

Punisr:..'T!ent r:la.Y reflect the

concept of desert: a.nd free moral agency.

Ho:<1ever,

punish.'T!ent (especially demeaning punishment) rr.ay have
negative side effects that cannot be ignored (Skinner,
1965).
Ramsay Clark (1970) and others may have overstated
the view that prisons only serve to embitter in.-nates.
Still, inmates do report being bitter.43

42 Justice Fellowship (1989) reported that reparative sanctions
reduce recidivism.

Diversionary programs may have a built-in

selection bias, however.
repeat offenders.
43 Personal observation.

They generally do not choose severe or
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Current penological paradigms do not allow inmates
to pay back any fine to their victims.

Making license

plates for the state (which they have offended under
American law) does nothing to right the wrong to the
victims.

Fyodor Dostoyevski, an ex-prisoner from

Siberia and author on crime, testified:

"If one wanted

to crush, to annihilate a man utterly, to inflict on
him the most terrible of punishments

. . one need

only give him work of an absolutely, completely useless
and irrational character• (Colson, 1990, pp. 197-198).
Reid expects inmate/patients to improve in therapy
if they can overcome their responsibility avoidance
{Reid, 1986) .

Penal programs that included a response

cost element would restore the inmate's sense of
dignity.

Criminals could be required to pay for their

incarceration as well as pay restitution to victims
(Justice Fellowship, 1989).

This would restore the

peace {shalom) and reconcile them to their victims.
The restoration of shalom may make psychotherapy
possible.

Moral Education
Moral development is a valid domain of study for
psychologists.

The most common subject in moral
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development research is the acquisition of moral
reasoning ability in children (Edelman & Goldstein,
1982; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992; Kohlberg, 1981).

Stunted

moral development is implicit in the thecries of severe
criminality surveyed above.

Criminals lie, steal, and

kill.
Moralizing or preaching at severe criminals is not
likely to be successful.

However, some form of moral

education may make psychotherapy possible.

Criminals

taught the existence of universal standards, empathy,
and responsibility may respond.

Most moral development

research is done on norrnal, growing children (Gibbs &
Basinger, 1992).

W"~ether

Kohlberg's cognitive-moral

theory applies to remediating offenders is unknown.
Kegan (1986) believed so.

He postulated that

p~rt

of the core of psychopathy is a moral-developmental
arrest.

He saw psychopaths as fixated at Kohlberg's

instru.~ental

level of moral functioning (i.e., stage 2)

(see Table 17).
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Table 17
A Brief Description of Kohlberg's Coanitive-Moral
Developmental Stages
Levels and Stages

Stage Orientations

Preconventional Level
Stage 1

Punishment and Obedience

Stage 2

Instrumental Relativist

Conventional Level
Stage 3

Interpersonal Concordance

Stage 4

Law and Order

Postconventional Level
Stage

s

Sta e 6

Social Contract/Legalise
Universal Ethical-Princiole

Some prison programs teach a values-clarification
approach to inmates (Elem, 1990) .

Edelman and

Goldstein (1982) noted that values clarification is
based on the untenable assumption that values are
relative. 44

The notion of values-relativity may appeal

to the morally-arrested psychopath all too well.
Other, more robust methods of moral education may be in

44 However, values-clarification exercises may have benefits,
especially for the morally mature {H. Lewis, 1990).
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Didactic

character education programs may be more appropriate
for criminal populations.
Character education need not

eq~al

indoctrination.

Edelman and Goldstein defined indoctrination as •the
teaching of certain values, attitudes, or beliefs
without due regard to thoughtful reflection and direct,

open inquiry and discussion concerning their
reasonableness

a.~d

worth in light of other, alternative

values or beliefs" (1982, p. 260).
moral education

~ithouc

As an example of

indoctrinat~on,

they cited the

Character Ed:Jca.t.iqn 0.irr;icµ.l:l.h'n, which attempts to shew
the reasonableness and utility of traditional
(1982).

val~es

Relatedly, Etzioni (19931 and Bellah (1991)

advocated the teaching of prosocial

co~rr~nity

order to halt American moral decline.

values in

These moral

virtues could be. taught to criminals as well.

Teaching

them to "at risk" predelinquents may be even better.
The link between arrested moral development in
severe criminals and psychotherapy needs to be
addressed by empirical research.

Also, teaching moral

values to the antisocially disordered may make them
more amenable to therapy.
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Recognition of Evil: The Foundation of a Restorative
Forensic Psychology

Both the general public and practicing
psychologists are pessimistic about rehabilitating
severe criminals.

Strictly speaking, criminals need to

be habilitated, not rehabilitated.
The Christian view of real evil illuminates the
importance of this task.
naturally good.

Human beings are not

Left to themselves without moral

education or responsibility acquisition, they will
remain in a selfish, morally bankrupt homeostasis.
Psychologists who wish to practice ethically will
not allow their services to be meted out as punishment.
The distinction between professional psychological
services and punishment can only be retained if social
penalty is kept separate from psychotherapy.

The

Christian view of the dignity and responsibility of
humanity makes this view tenable and saves
psychological ethics.
Restorative justice is a biblical concept.

It

serves a psychological function by restoring the peace
(shalom) and the sense of personal responsibility that

makes psychotherapy possible.
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The moral development of of fenders needs to be
studied further.

The development of 'moral sensitivity

may also :r.ake psychopaths and other severe criminals
amenable to therapy.

Primary and secondary prevention

programs could be designed to help morally stunted
youth as well.
The recognition of real evil in hurnan nature
facilitates the practice of forensic psychology.
Therapeutic nihilism may be a premature conclusion.

To

move beyond the "nothing works" malaise that hangs over
forensic psychology may be possible by adopti::.g
approaches to psychotherapy that directly address
morality and personal responsibility in severe
criminals.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMM.~.RY,

SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSION

A Recapitulation of Results

In Plato's dialogue Gorqias (1990). Socrates
argued that ignoring evil is worse than evil itself.
He contended that the application of justice overcomes
evil in the same way that the application of medicine
overcomes illness.
Socrates also observed that criminals seek to
avoid responsibility and think that avoidance will make
them happy.

It actually makes them "the most miserable

of all men" (Plato, 1990, p. 270), because criminals
are moral agents, men and women created in the image of
God.
Restorative justice was advanced as a model on
which to construct a forensic psychology.

Directly

addressing the issues of responsibility avoidance and
moral fixation may make successful psychotherapy
possible.

Acknowledging evil and making restitution (a

response cost) for it can make real growth possible.
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Ignoring evil blocks therapeutic growth.

The

whole community suffers as well when the peace (shalom)
is disturbed.
This restorative forensic psychology was based on
an examination of human nature.

Shneidman's paradigm

was used to argue that criminality is a quasipsychological construct.

Criminal behavior, like

suicidal behavior, does not fit into one diagnostic
box.

Therefore crime ought not be studied parochially.

Philosophical, sociological, theological, and other
perspectives should be examined as well.

This

methodology better accounts for hUI!'an natur8 and
effectively integrates into forensic psychology

t~e

common-sense attribution that severe criminality is
evil.
Special treatment was given to criminality as it
is currently conceived by major forensic theorists.
Antisocial Personality Disorder and the criminal
personality were discussed.

The psychopathy construct

as const:::ued by psychoanalytic theorists and by Hare
was reviewed.

Inherent in these theories is the

judgment that certain behavior is wrong or evil.
A discussion of psychological cause and effect
focused on the Aristotelian and Hippocratic views and
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showed that the idea of cause is not as simple as it
seems.

Divine and human agency are not contradictory.

Also, causes may function as predispositions or
excitations; from this psychology and medicine have
derived the notion of diathesis and stress.
This means that everyone is predisposed to certain
conditions or behaviors, criminality included.

Being

predisposed (the material cause) alone never means
predestination.

The idea of psychological well-being

presupposes a design plan, or formal cause of behavior
which is theoretically attainable.

Personal choice or

agency is always a factor in criminality.

Finally, the

notion of purpose, or teleology, implies a final cause.
Most importantly, moral agents are not objects.
They are subjects who are the efficient causes of their
behavior.

Therefore, would-be criminals are not

determined by their immature object relations (Meloy,
1988).

Their criminal personality may be rigid, but it

is not permanently fixed (Samenow, 1984).
Criminals were designed for something better, that
is to image their Creator.

They are fallen, but they

still have a conscience to give them feedback.
(1990) argued, not even psychopaths can have no
conscience:

they have only deconditioned it.

As Kant
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The fall was into real evil.

Katz (1988)

documented a real gangland temptation to be "bad."
Staub (1989) could not explain Nazi criminality without
recourse to traditional, Judea-Christian beliefs about
evil.
Evolutionary views do a poor job of describing
evil.

In such theories, evil is seen as a necessary

byproduct of progress.

These views would be irrational

to believe even if they were correct.

This is because

evolution-derived views undermine the concept of
rationality.
Augustine's (1990)

vie'.~

is better and in keeping

with common-sense observation.
of real huroan

actio~s.

corrupts every person.

Real evil is the result

It is pervasive:

real evil

Evil was shewn to be a quality

that exists in different quantities in every person.
Therefore, Augustine's doctrine of total depravity was
retained.
This analysis of human nature was rooted in the
meta-theoretical discussion of the philosophy of
science.

The view of science developed made the

inquiry into the crime/evil construct possible.
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Theology was characterized as a science.

The

methods used in theology are not esoteric but are in
keeping with other uses of the scientific method.
Psychology, theology, and the other sciences make
use of idiographic and nomothetic methods.

The

scientific disciplines, psychology and theology
included, need to adopt a value-critical stance.

The

fact-value dichotomy is false and misleading.
In psychology, as in all sciences, theories are
undetermined by the facts.

Theory-building is value-

laden; it contains a tacit dimension.

Scientism, not

science, expects a neutral process to describe the sum
total of reality.

In fact, scientific work in the

natural and human sciences requires hermeneutics.
Thus, all facts are interpra-facts because facts are
mute and cannot speak for themselves.
The view that all human activity is religious,
including scientific activity, was maintained.

Wnen

this is combined with the conclusion that evil is
pervasive in every person, criminal and investigator
alike, that scientists are prone to avoid examining
evil is no wonder.
The idea of the unity of all truth, psychological,
theological, criminological, and so forth, was
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advanced.

The notion that all truth is God's truth

wherever it may be found was argued.

Theism actually

rules out dogmatism because no science is the queen of
the sciences.

Scientists are equal partners in the

truth-gathering process.

Suggestions for Further Research

Therapies that directly confront the evil behavior
of forensic patients could be devised and tested
against traditional therapies.

The PCL and criteria

for APD could be used for screening and assignment
purposes.
Orling's Cognitive-Style Questionnaire, an
instrument with good validity and reliability, could be
used as an outcome measure (Thaler, 1991).

The Exner

(1990) method and Gacono, Meloy, and Heaven's (1990)
criteria could be combined to score the Rorschach.
There is theoretical warrant to use measures of moral
development and spiritual well-being as well (Ellison,
1983; Gibbs & Basinger, 1992).
Prison therapy programs that include restorative
justice components could be tested against traditional
corrections.

The

sa~e

outcome measures, as well as
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recidivism rates, could be analyzed.

However, the same

caveats that apply to recidivism studies in general
would apply.

Also, large-scale changes in correctional

policy require legislative mandate and financing.
Spending money on prison programs is not usually a
fiscal priority.
A more cost-effective method may be to study
convicts in community-based restitution programs.

They

could be compared to other offenders in the community,
such as those on parole and under electronic house
arrest.
Churches have traditionally provided the type of
social support that encourages reintegration into the
community (i.e., the restoration of shalom)
Johnson, 1982).

(Bufford &

Church and community-based Victim-

Offender Reconciliation Programs (V.O.R.P.) and their
participants need further study (Colson & Van Ness,
1989).

Confi.t1lling real psychological changes in

offenders could validate these cost-effective programs.
Further, in a more general way, the crime and evil
construct could be applied to other psychological
dysfunctions.

The recognition of the role of evil in

other psychopathology should make for a more
scientifically rigorous abnormal psychology.
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Conclusion

The conunon-sense attribution that severe
criminality is both evil and psychopathological is
vindicated by this study.

Evil is a real phenomenon.

A psychological theory that arbitrarily disregards evil
a priori is prejudicially excluding data that explain
hu.rnan behavior.
Cri~inals

are difficult to treat psychologically.

They are unlikely to change because a core factor in
criminality appears to

b~

an unwillingness to change.

This unwillingness could also be called unrepentance.
The "nothing works"

pessim~sm

treatment is premature, however.

in forensic

Until forensic

psychological theories attend to the whole data set .of
human behavior, not everything has even been tried.
Therapies that deal with the psychodynamics,
cognitive-style, habits, and object relations of severe
criminals need to be amalganiated with a recognition of
the evil criminals do.

Psychopathy has been called an

ethical disorder (Mullen, 1992) .
moral/ethical therapy.

Severe criminals need
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The recognition of real evil will have real
ramifications in therapy.

Safety will be a concern.

Countertransference will certainly be an issue, and not
just for psychodynamic therapists.

Firm limits will

need to be set.
Patients with other mental health diagnoses resist
psychological healing (Kernberg, 1984; Yalom, 1990).
This problem is worse with severe criminal clients.
Not only will they resist you, many will try to
manipulate you.

Some will threaten to kill you.

The therapist and patient have a common factor,
however.
evil.

Both have experienced the temptation to do

Real evil, a human universal, makes real empathy

possible.
The universality of evil makes therapists and
criminals into co-conspirators and accomplices.

This

makes therapy with a difficult population worthwhile
and interesting because it teaches us about life and
about ourselves.
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Glossary of Terms

Archimetiean point:

a foundational or

presuppositional starting point for a theory, based on
the statement attributed to Archimedes, "give me a
fixed point (a fulcrum) and I will move the earth."

classical foµndationalism:

the position that one

is only justified in holding a belief if one has
sufficient evidence (warrant) for doing so.
~:

statute.

a legal clas3ification deter.:nined by

Criminality is the behavior o: criminals.

Because most persons (especially males) commit some
crime in their lives, criminality is usually used as
denoting only severe criminality (Wilson & Herrnstein,
1985).

Crime rates in

~-~erica

are measured with the

Uniform Crime Report (UCR), which is derived from law
enforcement reports, and the National Crime Survey
(NCS), a random survey of victimization.

The UCR has

been criticized for being politically manipulated as it
is deper.dent on police reports.

The NCS responders

also may underreport domestic violence because the
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abuser may be present during the survey.

It is also

dependent on victims' memories, especially of when a
crime happened {a crime that was actually outside the
survey period may be counted) .

critical rationalism:

the view of science

associated with Karl Popper that science can only
falsify but never verify hypotheses.

criminological psvchology:

a term often used

synonymously with forensic psychology in this
investigation.

Criminological psychology often has the

connotation of postadjudication consultation.

empiricism:

the view that reality is only known

by e..""tperience; usually related to the idea that
induct:ve methods are superior to deductive ones for
ascertaining truth.

epistemic warrant and properlv Pasic beliefs:

in

Plantinga's thought, the idea that some beliefs are
properly basic and that one may be reasonable in
holding

the.~

on the basis of no evidence at all.

For

Plantinga, belief in God exhibits proper basicality.
This construct does not address the veracity of a truth
claim, per se, but whether one could be considered
reasonable for holding to that claim.
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~:

morally wrong; immoral; wicked.

This

dissertation argued that people generally attribute
evil (as well as pathological) motivations to
criminals.

However, since Nietzsche, the trend has

been to transcend or go Bevond Good and Evil in western
thought (1886/1990) .

Instead, psychology should revive

and employ the concept of evil in order to better
describe criminal behavior.

forensic psychology:

any psychological practice

done in a forensic !legal) setting.

This would include

any (a) assessrr.ent, triage, and :reatrnent in jails or
prisons; (bl pre-adjudication determinations of
custody, competency to stand trial, treatment to
recover competency (to stand trial, be executed, etc.);
and (c) determinations of dangerousness, suitability
for parole or special programs as mandated by statute.

human sciences:

sometimes thought of as a cross

between the humanities and the hard sciences.

As noted

in chapter 2, the human sciences often describe a
grouping of the sciences.
human science methods,

irrationalism:

Other researches write about

(i.e., idiographic methods).

in the philosophy of science, the

view that scientific progress is more the result of
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forces outside of science, such as politics, chance,
social forces, and so forth, than of rational progress.
naturalism:

the view that only natural

explanations of phenomena are meaningful; an antonym of
supernaturalism.
DQSitivism:

the view that metaphysics should be

avoided in science and that parsimonious laws should be
the goal of science (Popper, 1963).
pragmatism:

usually refers to an eclectic model

of the philosophy of science like that of Larry Laudan
(1990}.

The pragmatist has many values in science, and

these values must be weighted when measuring rival
theories.
psycbovathy:

a personality construct refined by

Cleckley; often used as a synonym for sociopathy.

Hare

has operationalized psychopathy with his checklist, the
Psychopathy Check-List (PCL).

Meloy, a psychodynamic

theorist, has done much to develop the construct.

Some

believe that a psychopathy-like diagnostic label would
be a more meaningful clinical tool than DSM antisocial
personality.
realism:

the view that the results and

conclusions of science correspond exactly to the real
world.

Moreland (1989) acknowledged the antirealist
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critique and adopted realism or antirealism on a caseby-case basis.
scientism:

the view explained in chapter 1 that

inflates science to a status as arbiter of truch.

Lay

advocates of scientism are often uncritically accepting
of scientific experts and are usually unaware of the
critique of science.
supernaturalism:

the view that phenomena that

defy currently accepted laws of nature should not be
ruled out a priori.

Supernaturalism does not imply

that these

are

phe~omena

theodicy:

co~.mon,

however.

the investigation of the problem of

evil in respect to God's righteousr.ess.

Theodicies

attempt to explain how a good God can allow suffering,
calamity, and death.
weltanschauung:

world-life-view.

The New

Introducto:r:y Lectures on Psvcho-Analysis provides a
good definition:

"an intellectual construction, which

gives a unified solution of all the problems of our
existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a
construction therefore, in which no question is left
open and in which all we are interested in finds a
place" (Freud, 1939/1990, p. 874).
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Technical and Common Usage of Realism and its Opposites

utopian,

COMMON

UNIVERSAL

absolutes
are in

accepted.

PERCEPTUAL

perception ~erceptual Dual isr:i.:
is of real objects.ne only perceives

ima. es.

ar.:;!

SCIENCE

tells us about the
real world.
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Appendix C

Hare's Psychopathy Check-List

Score
(0,1,2)
1. Glibness/Superficial Chann
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth
3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
4. Pathological lying
5. Conning/Manipulation
6. Lack of remorse er guilt
7. Shallow affect
8. Callous/lack of empathy
9. Parasitic lifestyle
10. Poor behavioral controls
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior
12. Early behavior problems
13. Lack of realistic, long-tenn goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
16. Failure to accept responsibility for own
actions
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17. Many short-term marital relationships
18. Juvenile delinquency
19. Revocation of conditional release
20. Criminal versatility
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Appendix D

Kant's Proof of the Existence of God from Conscience

The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man
(before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one
another•) is CONSCIENCE.
Every man has a conscience, and finds himself
observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps
him in awe (reverence combined with fear); and this
power which watches over the laws within him is not
something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but is
incorporated in his being.

It follows him like his

shadow, when he thinks to escape.

He may indeed

stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions, but
cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking,
and then he at once perceives its awful voice.

In his

utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to
it, but he cannot avoid hearing it.
Now this original intellectual and (as a
conception of duty) moral capacity, called conscience,
has this peculiarity in it, that although its business
is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself
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compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the
command of another person.

For the transaction here is

the conduct of a trial (causal before a tribunal.

But

tr.at he who is accused by his car.science should be
conceived as one and the same person with the judge is
an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the
complainant would always lose his case.

Therefore, in

all duties the conscience of the man must regard
another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it
is to avoid self-contradiction.

Now this other may be

an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames
to itself.

Such an idealized person (the authorized

jt.<C.ge of conscience) must be one who k..'lo;.·s the heart;
for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of

rr~n;

at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is,
must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom
all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since
conscience is the inward judge of all free actions.
Now, since such a moral being must at the same time
possess all power (in heaven and earth), since
otherwise he could not give his commands their proper
effect (which the office of judge necessarily
requires), and since such a moral being possessing
power over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be
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conceived as the subjective principle of a
responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay, this
latter concept is contained (though it be only
obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness. (Kant,
1990, p. 379)
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